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ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS SINCERITY
Nathan S. Chapman
Abstract: Recent disputes about the “contraception mandate” under the Affordable Care
Act and about the provision of goods and services for same-sex weddings have drawn
attention to the law of religious accommodations. So far, however, one of the requirements of
a religious accommodation claim has escaped sustained scholarly attention: a claimant must
be sincere. Historically, scholars have contested this requirement on the ground that
adjudicating religious sincerity requires government officials to delve too deeply into
religious questions, something the Establishment Clause forbids. Until recently, however, the
doctrine was fairly clear: though the government may not evaluate the objective accuracy or
plausibility of a claimant’s religious beliefs, it may adjudicate whether the claimant holds
those beliefs sincerely.
Unfortunately, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby introduced confusion. The majority opinion
appears to conflate the requirement that a claimant be sincere with the requirement that the
claimant show that the government has “substantially burdened” the claimant’s religious
exercise. The dissenting opinion, by contrast, suggests that courts simply may not adjudicate
religious sincerity. The first of these mistakes muddies the water about the relationship
between sincerity and the other elements of a religious accommodation claim; the second
illustrates the ongoing confusion for many jurists and scholars about the constitutional
concerns surrounding an inquiry into a claimant’s religious sincerity.
This Article attempts to defend and clarify the sincerity requirement. Against the
scholarly consensus, it argues that courts can and should adjudicate an accommodation
claimant’s religious sincerity. Insincere claims impose costs on the government, third parties,
and religious liberty itself. Courts can adjudicate sincerity, and reduce these costs, without
violating the Establishment Clause. The Constitution’s “no-orthodoxy principle” should be
understood to prohibit a court from inferring that a claimant is insincere merely because the
claimant’s religious belief is implausible. Otherwise, a court should evaluate a claimant’s
sincerity by applying the ordinary rules of evidence. Moreover, when the claimant’s sincerity
is not in issue, a court should resist allowing its suspicion to affect the rest of its legal
analysis. Finally, the Article clarifies the distinctions between whether a claimant is sincere,
whether the claim is based on religious exercise, and whether the government has imposed a
substantial burden on that exercise.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to those who
have commented on prior drafts or discussed these issues with me: Sam Bray, Dan Coenen, Marc
DeGirolami, Chad Flanders, Rick Garnett, Fred Geddicks, Luke Goodrich, Kent Greenawalt,
Michael Helfand, Brian Lea, Hillel Levin, Chris Lund, Michael McConnell, Eric Rassbach, Mark
Rienzi, Usha Rodriguez, and Steve Smith. Thanks to Dean Bo Rutledge for support. Thank you also
to the participants in the 2017 Annual Law and Religion Roundtable, and to Robert Poole, who
provided excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Comedian John Oliver recently started a church, “Our Lady of
Perpetual Exemption.”1 He wanted to expose the tax exemptions
available to televangelists who exchange promises of prosperity for
donations.2 Within weeks, Oliver had received tens of thousands of
dollars.3 Oliver claimed the stunt was entirely legal—the church had
been incorporated in Texas, had complied with IRS registration
requirements, and was therefore entitled to receive unlimited donations
tax-free.4 It wasn’t. Even considering the IRS’s fuzzy conception of
“church,”5 “Our Lady” was missing a crucial component of a religious
accommodation claim: sincerity.6 The scheme was, of course, a parody.
By attempting to expose fraud, Oliver may have committed it.
Oliver is not alone in his confusion about the legal relevance of a
religious accommodation claimant’s sincerity. The black-letter law is
pretty clear, but scholars question it and judges—including Supreme
Court justices—misunderstand it. The rule is simple: to qualify for a
religious accommodation, a claimant must demonstrate sincerity.7
1. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Televangelists (HBO broadcast Aug. 16, 2015),
http://www.hbo.com/last-week-tonight-with-john-oliver/episodes/02/49-august-16-2105/video/ep49-clip-televangelists.html?autoplay=true [https://perma.cc/J3FX-LS8K] [hereinafter Last Week].
2. See Abby Ohlheiser, Comedian John Oliver Takes On the Prosperity Gospel By Becoming a
Televangelist, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-offaith/wp/2015/08/17/comedian-john-oliver-takes-on-the-prosperity-gospel-by-becoming-atelevangelist [http://perma.cc/Z4QP-JNAN].
3. Daniel Kreps, John Oliver Shuts Down Fake Church Over Unsolicited Semen, ROLLING
STONE (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/tv/news/john-oliver-shuts-down-fake-churchover-unsolicited-semen-20150914 [http://perma.cc/53DZ-JD77].
4. See Last Week, supra note 1.
5. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012) (lacking any definition of “church”); “Churches” Defined, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/churches-religious-organizations/churches-defined
[https://perma.cc/Q7Z8-4W5A] (explaining “[t]he term church is found, but not specifically
defined, in the Internal Revenue Code”).
6. Interestingly, Oliver noted the sincerity requirement. See Last Week, supra note 1. The fact
that he (and perhaps his lawyer) ignored it shows how unimportant they thought it was. Sometimes,
though, courts do adjudicate a church’s sincerity. See Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v.
Washington County, 304 N.W.2d 308, 318 (Minn. 1981) (Wahl, J., concurring specially) (finding
that the Tax Court’s sincerity analysis “is not clearly erroneous and should not be overturned here”);
Ecclesiastical Order of the ISM of AM, Inc., v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 833, 842 n.14 (1983) (deciding the
case on another ground though the government suspected the claimant was insincere).
7. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015) (discussing the requirements
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014) (discussing the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1955) (conscientious objection provision of
selective service statute); Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the
Courts after Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59, 59–60 (2014) (“There is a long tradition
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Courts and government officials adjudicate religious sincerity in a wide
variety of contexts: fraud;8 immigration;9 employment discrimination;10
prisoner religious accommodations;11 conscientious objection from
service in the armed forces;12 and statutory accommodations from
general laws.13 The requirement makes sense. The point of a religious
accommodation is to reduce the burden that a law may impose on
someone’s religious exercise. When a claimant is insincere, the law
imposes no burden on religious exercise at all.14
Yet scholars have long questioned the wisdom and constitutionality of
adjudicating religious sincerity. Most of them have endorsed Justice
Jackson’s dissenting opinion in the 1944 case United States v. Ballard.15
The Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment forbids the
government from prosecuting persons on the ground that their religious
beliefs are empirically inaccurate. Doing so requires the government to
evaluate theological claims, something the Establishment Clause forbids.
Justice Jackson would have gone further. He argued that courts should
read the First Amendment to also prohibit the government from

of courts competently scrutinizing asserted religious beliefs for sincerity without delving into their
validity or verity.”).
8. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See generally Stephen Senn, The Prosecution of
Religious Fraud, 17 FLA. ST. L. REV. 325 (1990).
9. Jiang v. Holder, 341 F. App’x 126 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that substantial evidence
supported conclusion of the immigration judge that Jiang submitted insufficient evidence to support
her claim that she was a practitioner of Falun Gong); see Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d
1341, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009) (Marcus, J., concurring) (“[W]hile the sovereign has a powerful interest
in preventing aliens from filing fraudulent petitions for [religious] asylum, malingering is not at
issue in this case.”).
10. Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 485–87 (5th Cir. 2014); Adeyeye v. Heartland
Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2013).
11. See Andreola v. Doyle, 260 F. App’x 935, 935 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming jury verdict that
prisoner’s beliefs were not sincere); Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 591 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Sotomayor, J.) (distinguishing between the truth of a religious belief and whether it is sincerely
held). See generally Kevin L. Brady, Note, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection: Can Lapsing
Prisoners Recover Under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431 (2011).
12. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 381; Hager v. Sec’y of Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449 (1st Cir. 1991);
Conscientious Objection, Army Reg. 600-43 (Aug. 21, 2006).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 723 (10th Cir. 2010) (denying
accommodation from marijuana laws); Friedman v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 75 F. App’x 815,
819 n.1 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying accommodation from immunization requirement).
14. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 52–
53; Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1417 (1967) (“[W]here the individual’s conduct is repeatedly at variance with
his avowed religious duties, restriction on his religious liberty is entirely academic—no serious
injury is done to his conscience.”).
15. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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evaluating whether persons actually hold the religious beliefs they
profess. His nuanced reasoning boiled down to the conviction that it is
impossible to adjudicate religious sincerity without also passing
judgment on whether the claimant’s beliefs are plausible.16
Based largely on this argument, Professor Kent Greenawalt’s
assessment probably reflects the mainstream view among legal scholars.
“[S]ome inquiry into sincerity is often essential,” but “for just the
reasons that Justice Jackson offered,” “alternative approaches [to
adjudicating religious sincerity] are preferable if they are feasible.”17
Some go further. Judge John Noonan argues that “Jackson seems to me
right”18—“the first amendment requires” the government to abstain from
inquiring into one’s religious sincerity.19 Even those scholars who accept
that adjudicating religious sincerity may be a necessary evil suggest
changing the ordinary rules of pleading and evidence to provide as much
protection for claimants as possible.20 No one has offered a sustained
defense of the adjudication of religious sincerity under the ordinary
pleading and evidentiary standards.21
16. See id. at 92–93.
17. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS
122–23 (2006); see also Giannella, supra note 14, at 1418 (concluding that while “Mr. Justice
Jackson’s arguments are especially persuasive in cases where government would otherwise act to
protect gullible citizens from spurious religious movements,” “precluding inquiry into sincerity
seems inappropriate when individuals make claim for special treatment vis-à-vis the state” to protect
from “dilution of government programs”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Apostle, Mr. Justice
Jackson, and the “Pathological Perspective” of the Free Exercise Clause, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1071, 1984 (2008); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 957 (1989) (“Because sincerity is tantamount to ‘honesty’ or
‘good faith,’ it may be necessary to, but it will rarely be sufficient as a screen for, free exercise
claims.”); Anna Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, 51 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 28 (2016)
[hereinafter Su, Judging Religious Sincerity]; Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion 30 Years
On, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 10 (2015) [hereinafter Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion]
(“[O]ne can fairly wonder about the capacity of institutional decision makers, such as arbitrators or
administrators of public benefits programs, to determine sincerity.”).
18. John T. Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
713, 720.
19. Id. at 724.
20. See KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW:
RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 280–83 (John Witte, Jr. ed., 2015); AVIGAIL
EISENBERG, REASONS OF IDENTITY: A NORMATIVE GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL
ASSESSMENT OF IDENTITY CLAIMS 103–11 (2009) (critically analyzing the way the Canadian
Supreme Court relies on a sincerity analysis to determine eligibility for an accommodation under
the Canadian Constitution).
21. The most thorough defense of the practice to date appeared in a law review article thirty
years ago. Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 299,
325–31; see also Adams & Barmore, supra note 7; Peter J. Riga, Religion, Sincerity, and Free
Exercise, 25 CATH. LAW. 246 (1980). As this paper goes to press, I have become aware of a
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Uneasiness about adjudicating religious sincerity was limited to law
reviews until the recent contraceptive mandate cases. During the oral
argument in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,22 Justice Kagan suggested that it
would be unconstitutional to “test the sincerity of religion.”23 Perhaps
channeling the prevailing scholarly view, Justice Sotomayor called it
“the most dangerous piece” of a religious accommodation analysis.24
And Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, joined by three other
justices, asserted that “a court must accept as true” a plaintiff’s “factual
allegations that a plaintiff’s beliefs are sincere and of a religious
nature.”25
Yet it is unclear whether these justices believe that the First
Amendment really precludes adjudication of religious sincerity. The
term after Hobby Lobby was decided, the Court stated in a unanimous
opinion that a religious accommodation claimant “bore the burden” of
“showing that the relevant exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely
held religious belief.”26
Worse, none of the justices in Hobby Lobby, majority or dissenting,
articulated a coherent distinction between adjudicating a claimant’s
religious sincerity and determining whether the government has placed a
“substantial burden” on the claimant’s religious exercise. Although
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, emphasized that the penalties for
failing to comply with the contraceptive mandate were a “substantial
burden,”27 the opinion failed to persuasively respond to Justice
Ginsburg’s charge that the Court’s analysis collapsed the sincerity and
substantial burden requirements, effectively allowing the claimants to

forthcoming chapter that may complement this Article’s argument. See Karen Lowentheil &
Elizabeth Reiner Platt, In Defense of the Sincerity Test, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS (Kevin Vallier
and Michael Weber eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 247) (on file with the author).
22. 573 U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
23. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354, 356)
(comments of Kagan, J.) [hereinafter Hobby Lobby Oral Argument].
24. Id. at 19–20 (Paul Clement: “I would think that the government in those kind of cases is
really going to resist the sincerity piece of the analysis.” Sotomayor, J.: “That’s the most dangerous
piece. That’s the one we’ve resisted in all our exercise jurisprudence, to measure the depth of
someone’s religious beliefs”). But see Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 591 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Sotomayor, J.) (“The opinions of the DOCS religious authorities cannot trump the plaintiff’s
sincere and religious belief.”).
25. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Kaemmerling v. Lappin,
553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
26. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., writing for a unanimous court).
27. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778.
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decide the issue for themselves.28 In the end, Hobby Lobby only
exacerbated the confusion about whether and how to adjudicate religious
sincerity.29
This Article argues that courts can, and should, adjudicate religious
sincerity. The analysis should proceed as any other factual determination
of a party’s mental state, with one caveat: the Constitution prohibits
courts from inferring insincerity from a religious belief’s inaccuracy or
implausibility. Furthermore, when the claimant’s sincerity is not in
issue—because the opponent has conceded the claimant’s sincerity or
because the issue is not relevant given the case’s procedural posture—
the court should not allow its suspicion about the claimant’s insincerity
to affect its analysis of the other elements of an accommodation claim.
Courts can, and should, carefully distinguish between three concepts:
whether a claimant is sincere, whether the claimant’s acts or omissions
are religious, and whether the government’s regulation imposes a
“substantial burden” on that “religious exercise.”
Part I of the Article explains the constitutional principle that frames
the disputes about adjudicating religious sincerity. Based on multiple
constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has articulated a number of
doctrines that arise from what this Article calls the “no-orthodoxy
principle”: the government may not distribute benefits and burdens on its
own evaluation of religious truth.
As Part II discusses, one of the doctrines based on this principle is
that the government may not evaluate the plausibility or accuracy of
one’s religious beliefs. Many scholars believe that this prohibition
effectively rules out the adjudication of religious sincerity too. As
Justice Jackson argued long ago, it is hard to distinguish between the
likelihood that a religious belief is accurate and the likelihood that the

28. See id. at 2798–99; Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2812 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May
(And Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 98, 102
(2017); Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, supra note 17, at 44–45.
29. See Su, Judging Religious Sincerity supra note 17, at 45 (“At this jurisprudential moment
then, it is clear that the twin legal threshold of sincerity and substantial burden are all but such in
practice.”). Compare, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 28, at 98–99, 102 (arguing that courts should
evaluate, on the basis of “secular law,” whether the claimant will suffer “substantial religious costs”
as well as “substantial secular costs”), with Chad Flanders, Insubstantial Burdens, in RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS (Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 281) (on
file with the author) (arguing that “courts should largely defer to plaintiffs as to what is a burden on
their religious belief” so long as the claimant shows “that the government is actually doing
something to the plaintiffs”), and Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1771, 1775 (arguing that “in order to determine whether a burden is substantial, courts must
examine the substantiality of the civil penalties triggered by religious exercise”).
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claimant actually believes it. After carefully engaging with Justice
Jackson’s argument, Part II concludes that, though his premise was
sound, his conclusion does not follow. Courts can adjudicate religious
sincerity without running afoul of the no-orthodoxy principle by
declining to infer from evidence of a belief’s inaccuracy or
implausibility that the claimant is insincere.
But should they? Some argue that the constitutional risks of
adjudicating religious sincerity should lead courts to err on the side of
caution. As Part III of the Article argues, these scholars discount the
costs of declining to enforce religious sincerity. Some of these costs are
obvious. Fraud, whether based on religious claims or not, harms
innocent people and soaks up public resources. A hands-off approach to
religious sincerity invites false claims, which multiply litigation costs
and, when granted, impose costs on taxpayers and perhaps third
parties—all without relieving a burden from genuine religious exercise.
As Part III suggests, there are also subtler costs when courts believe
they cannot adjudicate religious sincerity. Suspicion that a claimant is
insincere won’t just disappear; it is likely to creep into the court’s
analysis of other elements of the accommodation claim. Moreover, the
widespread belief that “religious liberty” protects hucksters may erode
public support for religious accommodations altogether. Perhaps
counter-intuitively, adjudicating religious sincerity according to the noorthodoxy principle may be the best way to promote religious liberty
among those who are suspicious of phony claims.30
As this Article explains in Part IV, courts have all the tools they need
to do just that. Officials routinely evaluate the sincerity of witnesses and
the mental state of those accused of engaging in negligent
misrepresentation or knowing fraud. When they adjudicate religious
sincerity, courts must simply avoid inferring insincerity from inaccuracy,
something that could be accomplished in a jury trial with an ordinary
limiting instruction. This would permit a wide range of evidence that is
highly probative of religious sincerity: evidence of ulterior motives;
evidence of whether the claim “fits” with the claimant’s religious
biography; and evidence of whether the claim “fits” with the beliefs of
the claimant’s religious community (if any).

30. “The main components of religious liberty are the autonomy of religious institutions,
individual choice in matters of religion, and the freedom to put a chosen faith (if any) into practice.”
McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 14, at 1; see Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion, supra
note 17, at 5 (noting that McConnell’s definition of religious liberty “just about covered the
waterfront”).
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Having addressed how to adjudicate religious sincerity, the Article
concludes in Part V by sorting out the confusion about sincerity and
“substantial burden” in Hobby Lobby. Disentangling “sincerity,”
“religious exercise,” and “substantial burden” clarifies the disagreement
between the majority and dissenting justices. It also allows for a robust
response to the dissenting justices’ charge that the majority collapsed the
sincerity and “substantial burden” analyses, effectively deferring to the
claimant’s view on the issue. The claimants’ sincerity was not in issue.
Their “religious exercise” was abstaining from buying contraceptive
insurance and the “substantial burden” was the threatened fine for that
religious exercise. Contrary to the dissenting justices, the religiously
inspired moral reasoning that supported the claimants’ “religious
exercise” was legally immaterial to their sincerity, to the nature of the
“exercise” at issue, and to whether the regulation imposed a “substantial
burden” on that exercise. Perhaps Congress should more carefully define
the “substantial burden” component of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).31 Until it does, however, this Article suggests
that courts, guided by the statutory text and prior cases, can distinguish
between a claimant’s sincerity, whether the claim is based on religious
exercise, and whether the regulation at issue imposes a substantial
burden on that exercise.
I.

THE CONSTITUTION’S NO-ORTHODOXY PRINCIPLE

Professor Ana Su has noted that “[t]he emergence of the sincerity
requirement as a species of the religious question doctrine is a topic that
is yet to be addressed by scholars in this field.”32 This Part explains that
concerns about adjudicating sincerity, and the “religious question
doctrine” from which those concerns arise, are based more
fundamentally in a constitutional principle that the government may not
take a position on the accuracy of private religious beliefs. The “noorthodoxy principle,” as this Article calls it, arises from several
constitutional provisions, and the Supreme Court has applied it in a
variety of contexts. Evaluating disputes about the government’s role in
adjudicating religious sincerity requires comprehending the principle’s

31. Many debate the desirability of the current religious accommodation regime. Whether the
terms of that regime are optimal is beyond this Article’s scope. Changing them would not change
the Article’s core thesis: courts can and should directly address suspicion about the claimant’s
insincerity, and courts can and should avoid allowing such suspicion to influence the analysis of the
other components of an accommodation claim.
32. Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, supra note 17, at 30 n.6.
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origins, applications, and implications—and the limits of those
implications.
A.

Origins

The American framers broke with their English and colonial
experience to place religious truth beyond the government’s ken. The
protestant Church of England had been the established religion since the
sixteenth century.33 The Church maintained positions on several
Christian doctrines that were hotly contested both within the nation and
across Europe, doctrines about the nature of God and about what
happens to the bread and wine used during the Christian celebration of
Eucharist or Communion.34 To participate fully in England’s politics,
academics, and the legal profession, one had to subscribe to the
established church’s doctrines and participate in its ceremonies.35
As is well known, dissenters from the English religious establishment
founded several of the American colonies.36 Many of the colonies did
not dissent from the notion of an established religion altogether,
however—they simply preferred to establish a different Christian
denomination. The New England colonies, in particular, adopted
congregational puritanism instead of Anglicanism as their established
religion.37 Meanwhile, most of the Southern colonies officially favored
the Church of England until after the War of Independence.38
The framers of the United States Constitution did away with religious
tests for participation in government. Tucked into Article VI, better
known for establishing federal law as “the supreme Law of the Land,”39
the Religious Test Clause provides that “no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States.”40 At the time, most states required officials to subscribe
to Christianity or Protestantism.41 Though some Americans protested the
Religious Test Clause during the ratification debates, advocates of the

33. See, e.g., DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE LATER REFORMATION IN ENGLAND 1547–1603
(1990).
34. See id.
35. See Test Act of 1672, 25 Car. 2, ch. 2; Corporation Act of 1661, 13 Car. 2, stat. 2., c. 1.
36. See generally MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN IN THE WILDERNESS (1965).
37. SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 133 (1902).
38. Id. at 74.
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
41. See COBB, supra note 37, at 510–17.
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Constitution defended it with two arguments. First, without the
provision, one religious group, or a plurality of groups, would be able to
exclude others from fully participating in the government, effectively
rendering them second-class citizens.42 Second, without the provision,
the narrow-minded prejudice of some might discourage members of
disfavored religious groups who nevertheless exhibited republican
virtues from taking public office.43
As Gerard Bradley has argued, the Religious Test Clause has been
self-executing. Because it operates even-handedly, no one has ever been
subject to a religious test for federal office, and the clause has never
given rise to a legal dispute.44 The provision created a powerful baseline
of religious equality by ensuring that no one would be excluded from
federal office on account of religion. Such equality, even without the
Establishment or Free Exercise Clause, likewise extended a measure of
religious liberty to non-Christians by eliminating an incentive to ascribe
to a form of Christianity in exchange for access to public office.45
To quell concerns that the federal government would engage in
religious favoritism, the First Congress enacted the First Amendment,46
which forbids Congress from making any “law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”47 The
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause were the capstones on
the Constitution’s guarantee of religious freedom and equality. Broadly
understood, they promised that the federal government would never
grant political or civil rewards or impose legal burdens on the basis of
religious belief and exercise. The First Amendment furthermore

42. OLIVER ELLSWORTH, THE LANDHOLDER, VII, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION
UNITED STATES 167, 169 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (noting that if a religious oath
“were in favour of either congregationalists, presbyterians, episcopalions, baptists, or quakers, it
would incapacitate more than three-fourths of the American citizens for any publick office; and thus
degrade them from the rank of freemen”).
43. Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution of the United States of America, PA.
GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1787, at 2 (“The people may employ any wise or good citizen in the execution of
the various duties of the government.”).
44. Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty:
A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987); see also MORTON
BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS (1984).
45. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke’s
“Constitution of Freedom,” 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 393.
46. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); Vincent Philip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083
(2008).
47. U.S. CONST. amend I.
OF THE

06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2017 10:07 AM

1196

[Vol. 92:1185

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

guaranteed the freedoms of speech, of the press, and of the people
peaceably to assemble, each of which derived in part from English
common law accommodations for religious and political dissenters.48
Altogether, with the Test Clause, these provisions promoted religious
liberty and equality.
Early Americans advanced an array of justifications for religious
equality and liberty, some secular and others religious.49 All of them,
though, supported the principle that the government should not dispense
benefits and burdens on the basis of one’s religious beliefs. All except
one, that is. Civic republicans believed that religion promoted virtue, and
the development of public virtue was necessary for a republic to function
properly.50 Many civic republicans therefore believed that the
government should advance religiosity through education and public
ceremonies, and to some extent America continues to have vestiges of
“civic religion.”51 Civic republicans were not concerned that religious
minorities would be made to feel like political outsiders by the
government’s support for ceremonial religious practices. But some of
them, at least, were keenly committed to eliminating political burdens
imposed on religious minorities on account of their beliefs.52 Together,
the Religious Test Clause, Establishment Clause, and Free Exercise
Clause were understood to eliminate such burdens and to promote
political equality among citizens despite their disparate and constantly
evolving religious beliefs.
B.

Developing the No-Orthodoxy Principle

Although the outer bounds of these constitutional provisions are hotly
contested today, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the
government may generally take no position on religious doctrine. The
Supreme Court has developed this no-orthodoxy principle on the basis of
a variety of First Amendment provisions, and has applied it in a variety
of contexts. In United States v. Ballard, the Court held that the
Constitution forbids passing judgment on the accuracy of a religious
48. See JOHN INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 20–62
(2012).
49. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 377–88 (1996).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 380–88.
52. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode
Island (Aug. 18, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, JULY-NOV. 1790, 284, 285
(Dorothy Twohig et al. eds., 1996).
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accommodation claimant’s beliefs, but not on the claimant’s sincerity.53
Scholars continue to maintain that the Constitution ought to extend to
sincerity too. To better evaluate those arguments, this section provides a
brief overview of the breadth—and limits—of the no-orthodoxy
principle.
The principle found its first clear expression in a case involving a
dispute over church property. In Watson v. Jones,54 the Supreme Court
concluded that, under general common law, state courts could not
resolve property disputes that turn on the interpretation of religious
doctrine:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any
religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality
and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is
conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to
the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.55
As the Court stated nearly a century later in another church property
dispute, “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church
property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of
controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”56 These values,
explained Justice Brennan, include “the free development of religious
doctrine” and avoiding the imposition of “secular interests” on “matters
of purely ecclesiastical concern.”57 The first sounds in free exercise, both
individually and collectively, the latter in church autonomy. The Court
has extended this principle to other cases involving disputes over church
property,58 and to other cases involving a church’s selection of its own
ministers (sometimes called the “ministerial exception”).59

53. 322 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1944).
54. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
55. Id. at 728.
56. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720
(1976) (“the First Amendment commits” “the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies”
“exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals”); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S.
190 (1960); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
59. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012)
(holding that a “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination law is required by the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause).
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Courts refer to the prohibition on deciding disputes about religious
truth as the “religious question” doctrine.60 Scholars variously call it the
“no religious decision”61 principle or the “hands-off approach”62 to
religious questions. They offer a variety of justifications: “religious truth
by its nature [is] not subject to a test of validity determined by rational
thought and empiric knowledge”;63 courts are incompetent to understand
religious ideas;64 the government will harm or corrupt religion by getting
involved in it;65 and “secular authorities lack the power to answer”
“religious questions” “whose resolution is” “left to other [ecclesiastical]
institutions.”66 Usually a combination of these rationales supports a
court’s abstention from deciding a dispute over religious doctrine.67
For purposes of the present inquiry, however, the religious question
doctrine, and the church dispute cases usually associated with it, is best
understood as a species of the no-orthodoxy principle applied to judicial
power. The no-orthodoxy principle, drawn from a variety of
constitutional provisions, more broadly prohibits the government from
distributing benefits and burdens on the basis of religious doctrine. This
promotes religious liberty, both individual and corporate, and political
equality before the law. A court’s resolution of a private contest about
religious doctrine would throw the government’s power behind the
winning belief, thereby distributing secular benefits and burdens on the
basis of the government’s view of religious doctrine.68
60. See, e.g., Burgess v. Rock Creek Baptist Church, 734 F. Supp. 30, 31 (D.D.C. 1990). Some
scholars have questioned whether the doctrine leaves some litigants without a way to enforce what
they believe to be their rights under civil law. See Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 493, 501 (2013).
61. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 901–10 (4th ed. 2011).
62. Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking
About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 837 (2009).
63. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1232 n.46 (2d ed. 1988)
(quoting PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1964)). See generally Caleb E.
Mason, What Is Truth? Setting the Bounds of Justiciability in Religiously-Inflected Fast Disputes,
26 J.L. & RELIGION 91 (2011).
64. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714,
714 n.8 (1976) (“Civil judges obviously do not have the competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in
applying the ‘law’ that governs ecclesiastical disputes. . . .”).
65. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2009).
66. Garnett, supra note 62, at 861.
67. For a thoughtful critique of each justification, and an argument that the central animating
justification for the “hands-off approach” ought to be that “the political authority lacks power, or
jurisdiction, to answer,” id., and for religious questions, see id. at 855–62.
68. See Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 997 (1978) (“[B]ehind every [American]
judge stands ultimately the naked power of the 101st Airborne. . . .”). On the relationship between
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A corollary of the “religious question” doctrine is the First
Amendment prohibition on the government determining the “centrality”
of a religious belief to a religion.69 Ascertaining what is central to a
particular religious system or tradition, and what is periphery, is an
aspect of defining religious orthodoxy.70 Accordingly, the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and RFRA
protect “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief.”71 Whether a religious belief is
“sincerely held is different” from whether it is “central” to a religion,72
but the two can be easily confused.73 The difference is crucial, though.
Determining the centrality of a belief requires evaluating the relationship
between one belief of one person to an entire theology, belief system,
and practice, in all its diversity. This requires determining the center of a
theology, something about which coreligionists often disagree. A court
may not do so without preferring one theological position to another,
thus violating the no-orthodoxy principle. Adjudicating religious
sincerity, however, focuses on whether the claimant actually believes the
religious claim, not its relationship to other theological claims.74 As
explained below, adjudicating sincerity does not, and should not, entail a
judgment about the centrality or veracity of the religious claim itself.
The Supreme Court has likewise enforced the no-orthodoxy principle
in cases involving coerced religious speech. Holding that West Virginia
could not require public school students to salute the flag against their
religious beliefs, Justice Jackson unfurled some of the most stirring
rhetoric to grace the U.S. Reports:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force to confess by word or act their faith therein.75
state action, the distribution of private rights, and the Establishment Clause, see generally Nathan S.
Chapman, The Establishment Clause, State Action, and Town of Greece, 24 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 405 (2015) [hereinafter Chapman, State Action].
69. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (noting a constitutional prohibition on
determining “the place of a particular belief in a religion”); see also Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490
U.S. 680 (1989).
70. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012); id. § 2000bb-2(4) (referring to section 2000cc-5).
72. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 459 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).
73. See Hobby Lobby Oral Argument, supra note 23, at 19–20 (comments of Sotomayor, J.).
74. See, e.g., Watts, 459 F.3d at 1295 (“The test is sincerity, not centrality.”). Whether the belief
is “religious” is another matter. See infra section V.A.
75. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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Under the Free Speech Clause, the Court thus extended the noorthodoxy principle to protect private speech on all matters of
“opinion.”76
Although the Test Clause proved to be self-enforcing against the
federal government, the Supreme Court has extended its prohibition to
the states under the auspices of the Establishment Clause. In Torcaso v.
Watkins,77 the Court held that Maryland may not require notary publics
to swear that they believe in God.78 Although many of the constitutional
framers likely would have condoned excluding non-theists from public
office,79 Torcaso extends protection equally to atheists and agnostics
under the Establishment Clause.
Many of the contemporary cases that may seem to call the noorthodoxy principle into question actually reinforce it. The Supreme
Court has held that the government may sometimes display religious
symbols, including the Ten Commandments, on its property.80 Although
the Court has rarely achieved a majority opinion in these cases, the
justices who voted for the constitutionality of such displays have
uniformly emphasized that the government, in displaying religious
symbols, is not thereby promoting the veracity of the religious beliefs
those symbols represent.81 Rather, the government is acknowledging the
role of religion among its citizens, recalling historical events, or
promoting a spirit of civic unity (however ineffectively).82 What the
government is not doing, the justices maintain, is saying that one
religion is true and others are false.83 The reason the justices who have
voted to uphold religious displays rely on this argument, I would submit,
76. Including the opinion that one should “Live Free or Die.” See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment forbids New Hampshire from requiring Jehovah’s
Witnesses from displaying the state motto on their automobile license plates).
77. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
78. Id. at 495.
79. Indeed some ratification advocates defended the Test Clause on the ground that the Oath
Clause would exclude atheists. See Bradley, supra note 44.
80. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments monument because of its history and secular presentation).
81. Id. at 691–92.
82. See id. But see McCreary Co. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that framed copies of
the Ten Commandments in Kentucky courthouses violated the Establishment Clause because their
purpose was to promote religion).
83. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating “few individuals, whatever
their system of beliefs, are likely to have understood the [Ten Commandments] monument as
amounting . . . to a government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to promote
religion over nonreligion, to ‘engage in’ any ‘religious practice[e],’ to ‘compel’ any ‘religious
practic[e],’ or to ‘work deterrence’ of any ‘religious belief’”).
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is that affirmatively promoting one religion over another would test the
limits of the no-orthodoxy principle.
Another group of cases permit the government to endorse a form of
civic religion that has little theological content beyond theism. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in legislative prayer and ceremonial religious
speech cases may be best understood to permit the government to
engage in generic religious speech meant primarily to unite the political
community rather than to endorse religious orthodoxy.84 Indeed, the
more likely it is that an observer would attribute coherent and specific
religious speech to the government, as opposed to a private party, the
less likely it is that the speech is constitutional.85 The cases undoubtedly,
however, permit the government to promote theism over atheism.86 It is
questionable whether these decisions can be squared with the noorthodoxy principle.
It must be noted that the no-orthodoxy principle does not preclude the
government from deciding issues related to religion.87 The First
Amendment itself distributes benefits and burdens on the basis of
religion—just not on the basis of particular theological beliefs (or the
absence of them). On one hand, the Establishment Clause prohibits the
government from making a “law respecting an [E]stablishment of
religion.”88 On the other, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the
government from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.89 In the
course of making and enforcing law, therefore, the government cannot
avoid deciding matters that touch on religion and religious beliefs.90 But
it may not take a position on their relative merit in a way that affects
civil rights and liberties.
The no-orthodoxy principle poses a problem for adjudicating religious
sincerity. The government may not distribute benefits and burdens on

84. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (2014) (stating that
prayers before town board meetings fall within the tradition of legislative prayers by promoting
“universal themes, e.g., by calling for a ‘spirit of cooperation’”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
792 (1983) (stating opening prayers, which have been present throughout the history of the United
States, were not meant to proselytize or approve one religious view, but were seen as “conduct
whose . . . effect harmonize[d] with the tenets of some or all religions” (quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961))).
85. See Chapman, State Action, supra note 68.
86. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
87. See Garnett, supra note 62, at 850–54.
88. U.S. Const. amend. I.
89. Id.
90. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure
Observance of Practice with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 843 (1998).
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the basis of religious truth, but it can be difficult to distinguish between
whether a religious claim is “true” and whether the claimant “truly”
believes it. Whether the no-orthodoxy principle, as I have described it,
prohibits courts from inquiring into a claimant’s sincerity was
effectively the issue in United States v. Ballard, and many scholars
remain uneasy with the Court’s conclusion.
II.

THE BALLARD RULE AND JACKSON’S DISSENT

The no-orthodoxy principle discussed above is the impetus for
scholarly disputes about the government’s proper role in adjudicating
religious sincerity. Most scholars endorse the view of Justice Jackson,
dissenting in United States v. Ballard, that it is nearly impossible to
adjudicate religious sincerity without also deciding the accuracy or
plausibility of the claimant’s religious beliefs.91 This Part critiques
Jackson’s opinion, concluding courts may address most, but not all, of
the concerns he and subsequent scholars have identified. The next Part
discusses the costs to the government, third parties, and religious liberty
when government officials declined to adjudicate religious sincerity.

91. See GREENAWALT, supra note 17, at 122–23; Giannella, supra note 14, at 1418;
Krotozynski, supra note 17, at 1984; Lupu, supra note 17, at 957; Noonan, supra note 18, at 720–
21; Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, supra note 17, at 28; Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion,
supra note 17, at 10. In Reasons of Identity, Avigail Eisenberg provides a critical analysis of the
Canadian Supreme Court’s reliance on a religious claimant’s sincerity, alone, to determine
eligibility for a religious accommodation under the Canadian Constitution. EISENBERG, supra note
20, at 103–11. She acknowledges that evaluating a claimant’s sincerity, rather than the validity of
the claimant’s belief, “is at least designed to distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims in a
manner that avoids privileging the established tenets of religious faith according to religious elites;
that takes seriously the relation between identity assessments and the subjective nature of religious
belief; and that potentially broadens the scope of religious freedom so that it is more inclusive of
religious minorities.” Id. at 107. At the same time, from the standpoint of protecting minority
identity, she argues that courts should consider more than just the plaintiff’s sincerity. They should
also consider the “collective dimension” of the claim, id. at 108, and “the general character of [the]
religion, the practices it plausibly includes, and the role and importance of these practices to the
religion,” id. at 109. Relying on these considerations to determine the value of the claimant’s
religious exercise would raise serious concerns under the no-orthodoxy principle because they
would potentially require courts to decide among competing understandings of the religion at issue.
Under many U.S. religious accommodation statutes, such as RFRA, claimants are required to show
not only sincerity, but also that the government has placed a substantial burden on the claimant’s
religious exercise. As I argue in section V.B, this requirement is not onerous, but it is sufficiently
distinct from the requirement of religious sincerity to prevent the analysis from turning exclusively
on the claimant’s good faith.
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The Ballard Rule: Adjudicate Religious Sincerity, Not Accuracy

In United States v. Ballard, the Supreme Court held that the
government may not punish persons on the ground that their religious
beliefs are inaccurate.92 The Court tacitly suggested that courts may
adjudicate a religious claimant’s sincerity and perhaps even punish those
who defraud others by making false statements about their own religious
beliefs.93
The Court did not expressly distinguish between two forms of
truthfulness upon which philosophers rely: sincerity and accuracy.94 The
distinction, explored at length by Bernard Williams, is crucial for
identifying the limits of the no-orthodoxy principle.95 At its most basic,
accuracy is the disposition of “acquiring a correct belief in the first
place, and . . . transporting that belief in a reliable form” to others.96
Sincerity, by contrast, is the disposition “to say what one actually
believes.”97
The defendants in Ballard claimed to hold unusual religious beliefs,
including that they had the power to cure illness.98 In the process, they
made a great deal of money from converts and those who sought
healing.99 The government indicted them on multiple charges of mail
fraud.100 Before trial the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the
prosecution violated their First Amendment rights.101 At trial, the
government and the defendants agreed that the jury would not decide
whether the defendants’ statements were actually false—only whether

92. 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944).
93. Id. (explaining that the First Amendment placed the truth or falsity of the defendant’s beliefs
beyond the government’s reach, but declining to decide whether the defendant’s sincerity was
likewise beyond the government’s reach). For a wonderful account of the case and its progress
through the federal courts, see JOHN NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139–76 (1998).
94. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86–88; BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN
ESSAY IN GENEALOGY (2002).
95. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 94.
96. Id. at 37.
97. Id. at 44. Williams describes accuracy and sincerity as “virtues of truth” because in order to
exercise them one must overcome certain forms of resistance, including the “temptation” “to fantasy
and the wish.” Id. at 38, 44–45. He develops the dispositions and forms of resistance for each of
these virtues at length. See id. at 84–122 (sincerity); id. at 123–48 (accuracy).
98. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 80.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 79.
101. Id. at 81.
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they knew them to be false.102 In other words, the jury could find the
defendants guilty only if it concluded that they had been insincere about
their religious beliefs. And it did so.103
On appeal, the defendants argued that the question before the jury was
improper because it did not square with the indictment. The indictment,
they argued, required the government to show that the content of the
defendants’ claims were untrue, not only that the defendants “well
knew” them to be untrue.104 The appellate court agreed with the
defendants, holding that under the terms of the indictment, the
government was obligated to prove that the defendants’ claims were
inaccurate, not merely insincere.105
Whether the government may try the veracity of one’s religious
beliefs was the issue before the Supreme Court. The Court concluded
that the First Amendment foreclosed the government from passing
judgment on the accuracy of the defendants’ religious beliefs.106 Writing
for the Court, Justice Douglas offered a paean to the no-orthodoxy
principle:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief,
is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which
are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials
are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as
life to some may be incomprehensible to others.107
After emphasizing the religious freedom at stake, Douglas clarified
that any other rule would invite official distinctions on the basis of
theological bias:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem
incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the
religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake
102. Id. at 81–82.
103. Id. at 79.
104. Id. at 80.
105. Id. at 83.
106. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, saw no reason why the government could not introduce
evidence to the effect that the defendant had never healed anyone and had never been in San
Francisco (despite claiming he met St. Germain there). Id. at 89.
107. Id. at 86.
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that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First Amendment
does not select any one group or any one type of religion for
preferred treatment.108
The rule that the First Amendment forbids the government from
evaluating the accuracy of an individual’s religious beliefs has become
an entrenched application of the no-orthodoxy principle.
The Court did not squarely hold that the government may adjudicate
religious sincerity and punish insincere statements that amount to fraud,
but its disposition of the case strongly implied that result. It declined to
agree—twice—with Jackson’s powerful arguments that the First
Amendment prohibits prosecutions for religious insincerity.109
B.

Justice Jackson’s Dissenting Opinion: The No-Orthodoxy
Principle and Religious Sincerity

Jackson agreed with the majority that the First Amendment places the
accuracy of one’s religious beliefs beyond the government’s
competence; he disagreed, however, about whether the First Amendment
likewise places one’s religious sincerity beyond the government’s
adjudicative authority. Though his objections arose in a case about
criminal punishment, they apply with equal force to any governmental
adjudication of religious sincerity, including a court’s evaluation of a
religious accommodation claim. Furthermore, most scholars seem to be
persuaded by Jackson’s account,110 which remains the most thorough
and nuanced critique of the government’s authority to adjudicate
religious sincerity. Therefore this section carefully considers his three
arguments in turn. Each of them arises from a concern that judging
religious sincerity would violate the no-orthodoxy principle,
jeopardizing religious liberty and equality.

108. Id. at 87.
109. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (quashing the indictment on the ground
that the district court had excluded women from the grand jury pool). In my view, the Court’s best
option in Ballard was to quash the indictment on the ground that its allegations, as framed, could
not be established without determining the accuracy of the defendant’s claims. The indictment
charged that the claims were false and that the defendants “well knew” them to be false. Ballard,
322 U.S. at 80. It did not separately allege that the defendants falsely claimed to hold particular
beliefs. Another indictment should have been framed to focus solely on whether the defendants
believed what they said, without regard to whether those beliefs or statements accorded with
objective reality. Whether the mail fraud statute can sustain an indictment and conviction on the
basis of the speaker’s insincerity alone is a separate matter of statutory interpretation.
110. See supra notes 17–20.
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The Relationship Between Plausibility and Sincerity

Jackson’s first argument was that it is difficult, both conceptually and
as a matter of proof under the rules of evidence, to separate a statement’s
plausibility, if not its accuracy, from the speaker’s likely sincerity.111
The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to
show that they have been true in his experience. Likewise, that
one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that what he
said happened never did happen. How can the Government
prove these persons knew something to be false which it cannot
prove to be false? If we try religious sincerity severed from
religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very
considerations which in common experience provide its most
reliable answer.112
Here, Jackson identifies a powerful reason for courts to tread
carefully when reviewing a claimant’s religious sincerity. His overriding
concern is the no-orthodoxy principle. Evidence tending to show a
statement’s inaccuracy is also probative of whether the speaker believed
it. Unless the speaker has admitted that she does not believe the
statement, her sincerity must be proved (or disproved) by circumstantial
evidence. The best circumstantial evidence that someone knew his
statement to be false, maintains Jackson, is evidence that it was false—
which is precisely what the Court places out-of-bounds.113 It is therefore
nearly impossible, he argues, to distinguish sincerity (permitted) from
accuracy (forbidden).
Jackson is correct that evidence of a statement’s inaccuracy is
probative of the speaker’s sincerity. One might go even further than
Jackson did. What matters is not so much whether a statement is
accurate; people often sincerely believe things that turn out to be
inaccurate. For example, when a home seller says, “I thought the deck
was structurally sound,” the fact that it subsequently collapsed is some
evidence, perhaps, that the seller was insincere. But in most people’s
experience, it is reasonable to believe a deck is structurally sound absent
contrary evidence. It is the reasonableness or plausibility of the belief
that bears on the speaker’s sincerity, not the accuracy of it. And what is
reasonable or plausible depends on one’s experience. In an ordinary
111. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 92 (stating, “I do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is
believed from considerations as to what is believable”).
112. Id. at 92–93.
113. Chief Justice Stone and two others thought that examining the objective veracity of
religious claims would be fine. Id. at 89–90.
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case, a factfinder’s experience can be, and often is, supplemented by
expert witnesses and other evidence. But unlike the seller’s belief that a
deck is structurally sound, whether a religious belief is plausible must be
placed, alongside its accuracy, beyond the government’s authority by the
no-orthodoxy principle.
So, to give Jackson’s objection its due weight, it is not only evidence
that a belief is inaccurate that the no-orthodoxy principle rules out, but
also evidence that the belief is implausible or unreasonable. As Part V
argues, the ordinary rules of evidence do not address this constitutional
concern. Courts should take it into account when they adjudicate
sincerity by prohibiting the factfinder from inferring religious insincerity
from implausibility. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the
government may not adjudicate religious sincerity. As the next Part
explains, they have good reason to do so, and as Part V explains, they
can do so without violating the no-orthodoxy principle.
The Nonbeliever’s Bias

2.

Jackson’s second objection has to do with whether a nonbelieving
adjudicator can relate to a believer. He argues, “any inquiry into
intellectual honesty in religion raises profound psychological
problems.”114 Citing William James, “who wrote on these matters as a
scientist,” he argues that religion is deeply experiential.115 James
“reminds us that it is not theology and ceremonies which keep religion
going. Its vitality is in the religious experiences of many people.”116
Nonbelievers have never had the experiences that spurred the claimant’s
belief, and therefore they “are likely not to understand and are almost
certain not to believe him.”117
This argument is rich with irony. In the first place, Jackson, deciding
a case as a justice on the Supreme Court, is appealing to the authority of
religious studies (namely the religious psychology of William James) to
argue that the government should not evaluate religious beliefs.118 To be
sure, James was not espousing a particular religious belief or doctrine,
but he was certainly espousing a viewpoint about religious beliefs that,
though perhaps consistent with the epistemological assumptions of some
academic fields, is inconsistent with the views of many religious
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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believers.119 Some people would maintain that their religious faith is in
fact driven by theology and ceremony, not by experience. And others
would reject a clear distinction between the three.
Caleb Mason has made an argument similar to Jackson’s. He argues
that courts should accept the view of some philosophers that religious
statements are nonsense because they are not subject to revision on the
basis of empirical evidence.120 For this reason, Mason argues, courts
cannot evaluate claims about religious truth, but may evaluate claims
about non-religious truth (i.e., empirically evaluable claims) based on
religious motivations.121 Regardless of the merit of Mason’s view of
religious beliefs (many religious practitioners reject it),122 courts could
not base their fact finding on his view without violating the noorthodoxy principle because they would be taking sides in a religious
dispute. There is no vantage point on religion from which courts may
avoid the no-orthodoxy principle.
In the second place, Jackson argues that a nonbeliever is unlikely to
empathize with foreign religious beliefs, and, therefore, is unlikely to
trust the religious claimant. As a result, those with different religious
beliefs should not evaluate a claimant’s sincerity. Yet Jackson had
already confessed that he “can see in [the defendants’] teachings nothing
but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth.”123 Somewhat ironically,
then, he was able to perceive that his view of the plausibility of the
defendants’ claims may have biased him against the defendants’
sincerity. Jackson thereby performed what he claimed to be so difficult.
Jackson was over-claiming. Most people are likely to accept that
others sincerely believe some things that they find to be implausible.
Many hold religious beliefs that are implausible to others, and those who
don’t hold such beliefs probably have friends or family members who
do. Just as Jackson was able to do, most people will be able to
distinguish between whether another’s beliefs are accurate and whether
they are sincere. Furthermore, courts routinely instruct jurors to not
allow their biases or personal beliefs about this or that to interfere with
119. See id.
120. Mason, supra note 63, at 114; see also BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION?, ch. 2
(2013).
121. Mason, supra note 63, at 114.
122. Take, for instance, the claim that Jesus Christ has been raised from the dead, a
quintessential example of a meaningless sentence under the standards of analytical philosophy. No
less a practitioner than the Apostle Paul insisted that it was crucial to the Christian faith that Christ
was actually—empirically—resurrected, 1 Cor. 15:12–20, and many Christians maintain that view,
see generally N.T. WRIGHT, SURPRISED BY HOPE (2008).
123. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92.
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their evaluation of the evidence.124 There is no reason to think that bias
about the plausibility of a religious claim is especially hard to put aside
when one evaluates the claimant’s sincerity.
3.

The Believer’s Doubts

Jackson’s final objection focuses on the claimant’s epistemology. He
argues that “I do not know what degree of skepticism or disbelief in a
religious representation amounts to actionable fraud.”125 Judge John
Noonan finds this to be the “decisive[]” argument against adjudicating
religious sincerity.126
It is commonplace that doubt is often a component of religious belief.
The standard for actionable fraud, the standard under which the Ballards
were indicted, tried, and convicted, was knowing fraud.127 Knowledge is
neither faith nor doubt—it is certainty. The Ballards were not convicted
because, when they promised to heal people of their illness, they were in
fact having a crisis of faith. They were convicted because the jury
concluded that they knew for certain their claims were not true.128 The
Ballards could have presented, and a court and jury would surely have
considered, evidence to the effect that their beliefs, though sometimes
tried and beset by doubt, disappointment, and struggle, had nevertheless
been sincere. Most people can surely appreciate that such a faith may be
genuine.
Building on Jackson’s argument, Noonan develops a subtler one:
what if the religious claimant believes that her claims are metaphorical,
but allows her listeners to conclude that they are literal?129 What if the
Ballards, by telling their followers they would heal them, sincerely
believed that they could heal them spiritually, though not physically?
Such a statement may be sincere though it implies that the speaker
believes something she does not. What may distinguish sincerity from
insincerity in this case is whether the speaker intended to deceive the
hearer about her beliefs.130
124. See, e.g., infra section IV.B.2; see also Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81–82 (recounting the trial
court’s commitment to restricting the jury from considering the plausibility or accuracy of the
defendant’s religious statements).
125. Id. at 93.
126. NOONAN, supra note 93, at 718.
127. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 80 (“Each of the representations enumerated in the indictment was
followed by the charge that respondents ‘well knew’ it was false.”).
128. See id.
129. NOONAN, supra note 93, at 722–23.
130. See WILLIAMS, supra note 94, at 100–10 (discussing implicatures and equivocations).
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This well-founded concern can be addressed by ordinary rules of
evidence. The religious claimant could introduce evidence to the effect
that she sincerely holds her beliefs as metaphors, but not as objective
fact. Unless the fraud regulation requires full disclosure, the defendant
could not be punished.131 Those who hold beliefs to be true
metaphorically, rather than literally, know that they do. And even when
they are unsure whether their beliefs are true literally, metaphorically, or
neither, their state of mind—uncertainty—can be conveyed to others and
is subject to evidentiary contestation. Adjudicating doubt or nuanced
belief is in many ways no different from adjudicating mens rea: it is a
question of degree.
On the basis of the foregoing objections, Jackson concluded that
courts should be “done with this business of judicially examining other
peoples’ faiths.”132 Many scholars have either followed suit or
determined that adjudicating religious sincerity is, at best, a necessary
evil.133 Though the no-orthodoxy principle gives rise to these concerns,
it does not require courts to decline to adjudicate religious sincerity.
Furthermore, as the next Part argues, not adjudicating religious sincerity
likewise poses its own dangers to religious liberty and equality. Part IV
therefore explains that courts adjudicating sincerity should tweak the
rules of evidence to account for Jackson’s objections under the noorthodoxy principle, rather than to abandon the task altogether.
III. THE COSTS OF NOT ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS
SINCERITY
As scholars note, a court adjudicating religious sincerity risks
unconsciously discounting the likelihood of sincerity based on its own
appraisal of the belief’s plausibility, something the no-orthodoxy
principle forbids.134 Perhaps, then, the government should abstain from
adjudicating religious sincerity, whether in fraud or religious
accommodation cases. Doing so, some suggest, is the only way to
enforce the no-orthodoxy principle and to ensure the religious equality
and liberty it was meant to protect.
131. A law requiring full disclosure, even if it required a believer to admit, against his religion,
that his beliefs are purely metaphorical, does not violate the no-orthodoxy principle, for it does not
require the government to weigh in on religious truth. It may, however, impermissibly burden
religious exercise, depending on the relevant legal standard. Under Employment Division v. Smith, it
probably wouldn’t. Under RFRA, it might.
132. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95.
133. See supra notes 17–20.
134. See supra Part I.
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This Part explores the dangers of ignoring religious sincerity. All of
them stem from a presumption that religious insincerity happens—
religious hucksters have long been a staple of the American experience,
and accommodation claimants sometimes gin up religiosity to justify an
exemption.135 Ignoring insincere religious claims harms third parties,
leads to doctrinal “suspicion creep,” and erodes support for religious
liberty. The next Part argues that courts can adjudicate sincerity,
avoiding these costs, without violating the no-orthodoxy principle.
A.

The Costs of Insincerity

Common sense and experience suggest that insincerity about religion
is no less frequent than insincerity about anything else—perhaps more
so. In a nation that is religiously pluralistic and in some places deeply
religious, exaggerations, if not outright fibs, about one’s religious beliefs
are probably an important social lubricant.136 But like other forms of
false speech, religious insincerity can sometimes harm others. When it
does, the calculus of religious freedom flips. Conduct that was protected
may be punished. A claim for removing a burden on phony religious
exercise is nothing other than rent-seeking.
Religious insincerity causes two kinds of harm to others: fraud, either
on private parties or the government, and false accommodation claims,
either against a private employer or the government. The persons
harmed, and the gravity of that harm, depends on the context. Declining
to adjudicate religious sincerity would ignore these harms, and could
multiply them by inviting phony claims.
1.

Fraud

This paper focuses on the adjudication of religious sincerity in the
context of religious accommodation cases, but it is important to
remember that a general principle against adjudicating religious sincerity
would prohibit the government from prosecuting fraud—of any sort—
premised on religious insincerity. This is what John Oliver apparently

135. Of course, limiting religious accommodations by making the doctrine less generous would
also alleviate some of these costs. For purposes of this Article, I take the current doctrine across the
range of constitutional and statutory accommodations, federal and state, for granted. To the extent
the law does extend religious accommodations, however, failing to enforce the sincerity
requirement will come with the costs discussed in this Part.
136. See WILLIAMS, supra note 94, at 117 (“[I]t can be a tiresome feature of villages, as John
Stuart Mill observed, that everything is everyone’s business. Indeed, small traditional societies are
typically full of lies, because it is so hard to keep anything secret.”).
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believes the Constitution requires and what some scholars believe to be
desirable. Any attempt to capture the cost of avoiding inquiries into
religious sincerity must therefore consider the costs of religious fraud.
The harm of a confidence game is obvious. A religious charlatan uses
something that many people place beyond value to bilk them of money,
time, and energy. Justice Jackson argued that the worst harm of religious
fraud is the “mental and spiritual poison” it imparts to believers.137 He
further implied that the Constitution puts all the harms of religious fraud
beyond punishment.138 To the contrary: the First Amendment may
require Americans to “put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of
rubbish,”139 but it does not protect knowing falsehoods that harm others,
and it never has.140
2.

Accommodation Claims

The harms caused by false accommodation claims vary with the
circumstance. For instance, employers often contest a religious
accommodation plaintiff’s sincerity.141 When the employer chooses not
to grant an accommodation, the employee sues the employer for
discrimination. The plaintiff must demonstrate sincerity.142
The costs of religious insincerity in the employment context depend
on whether it is detected and litigated. If so, the costs are principally
those associated with litigating the dispute.143 If not, and the employer
137. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. United States v. Alvarez, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–46 (2012) (discussing cases
where the court held that the First Amendment does not protect knowing falsehoods that harm
others).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer to
“discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . religion . . .”); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2016)
(outlining the “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” elements of an employment
religious discrimination claim); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); J.
Gregory Grisham & Robbin W. Hutton, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: Current
Trends Under Title VII, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 60, 60 (2014) (“[T]here
has been an eighty-seven percent increase in the number of religious discrimination charges filed
with the [EEOC] over the past ten years.”).
142. Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 485–86 (5th Cir. 2014); Adeyeye v. Heartland
Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 451–54 (7th Cir. 2013); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433,
1438–39 (9th Cir. 1993).
143. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 121 (2009); Laura Beth
Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 175, 184–87 (2010).
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provides an “accommodation,” the costs amount to the sum of litigation
(if any) and the economic and social costs to the employer, other
employees, and perhaps even to customers, of giving the claimant
something of value to which the claimant was not entitled.144
Prisoner accommodation cases also sometimes raise issues of
religious sincerity.145 RLUIPA subjects state and federal prisoner
religious accommodation claims to the compelling-interest test.146 The
government has strong interests in prison uniformity, safety, and thrift,
so it often has good reason to challenge religious accommodation
requests on any ground available, including insincerity. 147 And unlike a
claim for an accommodation from a generally applicable law, the
potential political cost to the government of challenging a prisoner’s
religious sincerity approaches zero.
The costs of insincere religious accommodation claims in the prison
context are similar to those in the employee context, with a couple of
wrinkles. First, the taxpayer is paying the tab for the litigation and the
“accommodation” of a phony claim. Second, the “accommodation” may
impose some unique burdens on others, including heightened danger or
inconvenience for other inmates and prison officials.148
The final category of claims that may call for an adjudication of
religious sincerity arise when a claimant seeks an accommodation from a
legal obligation that allegedly imposes a burden on the claimant’s
religious exercise. A host of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
provisions either expressly provide for such an accommodation or have
been interpreted to do so. Some of them provide an accommodation
from a specific law or regulation, such as mandatory military service.
Others, like RFRA, potentially apply to virtually any legal obligation.
144. Dallan F. Flake, Bearing Burdens: Religious Accommodations that Adversely Affect
Coworker Morale, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 169, 171, 175 (2015); Jennifer Fowler-Hermes & Luisette
Gierbolini, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: The Devil Is in the Detail, 88 FLA. B.J. 34,
35 (2014).
145. For a thoughtful analysis of insincere prisoner religious accommodation claims, see Brady,
supra note 11.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to § 2000cc-5 (2012).
147. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863–65 (2015) (citing the government’s
compelling interest in prisons to reduce contraband or disguised identities); Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (describing congressional intent for RLUIPA to be applied with “the
urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions” in mind).
148. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863–65 (addressing the risks of RLUIPA as it must be applied with
deference to prison officials who must still maintain order, security, and discipline). A significant
risk to safety would probably defeat the claim under the “compelling governmental interest” and
“least restrictive means” elements of a prison accommodation claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012);
see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723.
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Although religious sincerity is a prerequisite for a successful religious
accommodation claim outside of the prison context, the government
rarely contests a claimant’s sincerity. This may be for several reasons.
One may be the no-orthodoxy principle. The government may be
concerned that delving into the claimant’s beliefs would violate the rule
that the government may not adjudicate the accuracy of a claimant’s
religious belief. Another reason may be that insincerity (like any mental
state) is hard to prove; many cases may be resolved in the government’s
favor on grounds that are easier to litigate. Yet another reason may be
that the adjudication of sincerity is ordinarily a question of fact, and the
vast majority of cases are resolved on questions of law before trial.149 A
final reason is that the government could be wary of political fallout for
questioning the sincerity of a claimant whose beliefs may resonate with
an important political constituency.
Given the costs associated with ignoring religious sincerity, the
government should not hesitate to contest sincerity when it has reason to
doubt the claimant’s credibility. As with prisoner accommodation
claims, an “accommodation” for other false accommodation claims may
impose costs on third parties.150 Religious accommodations, like all
governmental distributions of rights, entail a trade-off of public goods.
Religious freedom and equality is exchanged for administrative
complication, financial costs, and, in some cases, increased burdens on
others.151 Accommodating a conscientious objector to war, for instance,
shifts the burden of serving in the armed forces to another draftee. When
the claim is insincere, an accommodation generates public costs and
149. See generally infra section IV.B.
150. At some point a religious accommodation may impose so many costs on third parties that it
violates the Establishment Clause. See generally Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703
(1985). The degree to which a religious accommodation may burden third parties consistent with the
Establishment Clause is a matter of academic dispute. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett,
Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39 (2014);
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343
(2014). The Court has consistently upheld statutes that accommodate religious exercise, even at
another’s expense, so long as the accommodation is not absolute and the government has an
alternative way to alleviate the burdens imposed on third parties. See Brief of Constitutional Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, Et Al., Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354, 356).
151. For one account of how to determine whether an accommodation under a general
accommodation law such as RFRA imposes a burden on third parties, see generally Nelson Tebbe,
Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden Others?,
in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND
EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfield eds., forthcoming 2018) (on file with the
author).
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shifts private burdens without protecting religious liberty and equality.
Furthermore, as the next two sections suggest, permitting insincere
claims may indirectly harm religious liberty.
B.

Doctrinal Implications

Abstaining from determining a claimant’s sincerity also has negative
effects on religious accommodation doctrine. First, a court’s
unaddressed suspicion about the claimant’s sincerity may result in
“suspicion creep.” The court’s suspicion may affect its analysis of
whether the claimant’s beliefs are “religious,” and, if so, whether the
government’s regulation places a “substantial burden” on the claimant’s
religious exercise. Suspicion creep not only affects the analysis of the
claim before the court; it also can contort the doctrinal analysis for future
claimants whose claims are undoubtedly sincere.
Second, when courts are reticent to adjudicate religious sincerity,
insincere claims appear to be a bigger problem than they really are. The
government’s “interest” in avoiding insincere claims is more
“compelling” because there appears to be no way to stop them. An
accommodation in one case could be a floodgate for insincere claims.
The government has a “compelling interest” in preventing such a flood,
and therefore a “compelling interest” in rejecting an accommodation for
an admittedly sincere claimant.
1.

“Suspicion Creep”

Ignoring religious sincerity can lead to suspicion creep. Suppose a
court suspects a claimant is insincere. Suspicion creep occurs when a
court’s suspicion improperly influences its analysis of other doctrinal
components of the claim.
Religious accommodation claimants must ordinarily establish that the
government’s regulation places a “substantial burden” on their “religious
exercise.”152 To establish these elements, a claimant must show that the
beliefs are (1) sincere, (2) religious, and (3) substantially burdened.153
152. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 427–30
(2006); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb-4 (2012); Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–cc-5 (2012); Angela C. Carmella,
State Constitutional Protections of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence,
1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (discussing these elements in state constitutional law); Andy G. Olree, The
Continuing Threshold Test for Free Exercise Claims, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103 (2008)
(arguing that the prima facie case for claims under the Free Exercise Clause, including the sincerity
requirement, survived Smith).
153. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015); Oklevueha Native Am.

06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2017 10:07 AM

1216

[Vol. 92:1185

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

The government must then show that the regulation is the “least
restrictive means” of achieving a “compelling governmental interest.”154
Since claimants bear the burden of showing that their beliefs are
religious and substantially burdened, these are the components of a
religious accommodation claim most likely to suffer the effects of
suspicion creep.
Consider a recent case. A prisoner alleged that he believes the Flying
Spaghetti Monster is responsible for gravity (by pushing everything
down with its invisible glutinous appendages), and he seeks an
accommodation from prison regulations so that he can celebrate
“FSMism” by eating large bowls of pasta and wearing pirate garb.155
Suppose that the claim goes to a bench trial. Suppose further that the
judge (wrongly) believes that the no-orthodoxy principle prohibits the
adjudication of a claimant’s religious sincerity. But the judge cannot
shake the suspicion that the claimant does not really believe in the
Flying Spaghetti Monster. Were the judge to allow that suspicion to
influence, sub silentio, the analysis of another element of the
accommodation analysis, such as whether FSMism is really a “religion,”
or whether the prison regulations imposed a “substantial burden” on the
claimant’s “religious exercise,” the result would be suspicion creep.156
The ills of suspicion creep are at least twofold. At a minimum, a court
is issuing a judgment without giving the full reasons for it. The point of
written opinions is to demonstrate that the court is engaged in legal
reasoning and attempting to follow the law. A judgment based on secret
reasons undermines the rule of law. But judges probably routinely issue
judgments based in part on unstated—and indeed subconscious—
reasons. A more important concern, perhaps, is that suspicion creep can
have the unintended effect of perverting a court’s articulation of the
requirements for a religious accommodation claim, making it harder for
sincere claimants in future cases to state a claim.
Unsurprisingly, suspicion creep is hard to demonstrate. A judge is
unlikely to say he is ruling against a claimant on grounds other than
Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2016).
154. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012); Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012); Religious Freedom Protected, TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 110.003 (West 2011).
155. See Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 823–26 (D. Neb. 2016).
156. For a possible example of this, see Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1364
(11th Cir. 2009) (Edenfield, J., dissenting) (“[i]n this case, although the Immigration Judge never
directly addressed the issue of credibility, she commented throughout her order on the numerous
questionable aspects of Kazemzadeh’s conversion” and ultimately concluded that he did not have a
well-founded fear of religious persecution in Iran).
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sincerity because the judge suspects the claimant is insincere. And, of
course, religious insincerity rarely operates in a vacuum. A judgment
against an insincere religious accommodation claim, for instance, is
over-determined. Without sincerity, there is no “religious exercise” and
therefore no “substantial burden” on it.157
So how do we know that suspicion creep happens? Perhaps the best
answer, though the least susceptible to proof, is common sense. A
number of criminal defendants charged with illegal possession of
marijuana have claimed a religious accommodation. For every case in
which a court has expressly questioned the defendant’s religious
sincerity,158 there is another in which the court squeezed reasonable
suspicion about the claimant’s sincerity into its analysis of another
doctrinal question. One district judge, for instance, noted that “[t]he
Court has given [defendant] the benefit of the doubt by not scrutinizing
the sincerity of his beliefs . . . . even though it suspects [the defendant] is
astute enough to know that by calling his beliefs ‘religious,’ the First
Amendment or RFRA might immunize him from prosecution.”159
In other cases, a court’s rhetoric and analysis may suggest suspicion.
In one of the recent contraception mandate cases, for instance, Judge
Posner seemed to question whether the University of Notre Dame really
held the beliefs that motivated its accommodation claim. 160 Notre Dame
had argued that its religion forbade it from doing two things that the
regulation required: executing the paperwork that would legally
authorize and/or obligate its insurance providers to provide
contraception coverage; and maintaining a contractual relationship with
a provider that provided such coverage.161 The government did not
contest Notre Dame’s sincerity, so the court was bound to accept it.
157. See, e.g., Cavanaugh, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 824 (suggesting that “the deliberate absurdity of
[FSMism’s] provisions would undermine” prisoner’s argument for a religious accommodation).
158. See United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kuch, 288
F. Supp. 439, 444–45 (D.D.C. 1968) (“In short, the ‘Catechism and Handbook’ is full of goofy
nonsense, contradictions, and irreverent expressions. There is a conscious effort to assert in passing
the attributes of religion but obviously only for tactical purposes.”); Lineker v. State, No. A-8957,
2010 WL 200014 (Alaska Ct. App., Jan. 20, 2010) (upholding trial court determination that
claimant lacked a sincere religious belief for possessing marijuana).
159. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1509 (D. Wyo. 1995) (“The Court notes that
Meyers’ professed beliefs have an ad hoc quality that neatly justify his desire to smoke
marijuana.”); see also Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc., v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th
Cir. 2016) (holding, under similar circumstances, that a prohibition on marijuana use does not
“substantially burden” claimant’s asserted beliefs because the claimant’s religion does not require
marijuana use).
160. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015).
161. See Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d 606

06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2017 10:07 AM

1218

[Vol. 92:1185

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Nevertheless, Posner repeatedly framed Notre Dame’s allegations
about its religious beliefs in a way that suggested he was suspicious:
“[b]ecause of its contractual relations with the two [insurance
providers] . . . Notre Dame claims to be complicit in the sin of
contraception[;]”162 “Notre Dame tells us that it likewise objects to
[another regulatory] alternative.”163 The more appropriate way to put it,
given the procedural context, was that “Notre Dame [believes it is]
complicit” and “Notre Dame likewise objects to that alternative.”
Posner’s qualifiers suggest suspicion.
Furthermore, Posner emphasized a number of facts about the case that
may have been relevant to determining Notre Dame’s sincerity, but,
assuming its sincerity, had no bearing on whether the regulations created
a “substantial burden” on its religious exercise. He recalled that Notre
Dame’s prior conduct had been somewhat inconsistent with its religious
beliefs,164 emphasized repeatedly that he did not understand how Notre
Dame’s proposed regulatory solution would avoid complicity with sin,165
and contrasted Notre Dame’s religious objection with the objections of
other nonprofits that accepted the government’s accommodation.166 All
of these may be relevant to assessing Notre Dame’s sincerity, but once it
was established (or assumed as a matter of law) that Notre Dame
sincerely believed that its religion forbade it from the conduct required
by the government, these facts were irrelevant to whether the regulatory
scheme substantially burdened that religious exercise.167 Ultimately, it
seems likely that Posner raised these points because he believed that

(No. 13–3853).
162. Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 611 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 611 (Notre Dame signed Form 700 to avoid liability); see also id. at 610 (“When the
accommodation was promulgated in July of 2013, Notre Dame did not at first bring a new
suit . . . . Not until December 2013 did the university file the present suit, challenging the
accommodation. The delay in suing was awkward, since the regulations were to take effect . . . on
January 1, 2014.”); id. (“The next day—the last day before it would be penalized for violating the
regulations—the university signed EBSA Form 700 and thereby opted out of providing
contraceptive coverage for its employees . . . . Later it signed the same form regarding Aetna.”).
165. Id. at 612 (“It’s difficult to see how that would make the health plan any less of a ‘conduit’
between Notre Dame and Aetna/Meritain.”); see also id. at 617 (“Nor does Notre Dame explain
how a government program that directly or indirectly provided contraception coverage to Notre
Dame employees—as Notre Dame suggests—would avoid complicity in sin.”).
166. Id. at 618 (“Notre Dame tells us that it likewise objects to that alternative. . . . the
accommodation sought and received by Wheaton College.”).
167. Posner was correct that “the courts cannot substitute even the most sincere religious beliefs
for legal analysis” of whether the government was imposing a “substantial burden” under the
statute. See id. at 622; infra section V.B.
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Notre Dame was insincere, something he did not say directly, or because
he believed that their religious beliefs—especially their beliefs about
complicity—were implausible, something the no-orthodoxy principle
puts outside the courts’ authority.168
It is impossible to tell whether the court’s suspicion (or perhaps its
view that Notre Dame’s religious beliefs were implausible) affected its
doctrinal analysis. Because the court of appeals was only called upon to
determine whether the district court had abused its discretion by
declining to issue a preliminary injunction in the case, it did not have
occasion to conclusively determine the legal issues. Judge Posner’s
rhetoric and analysis suggest, however, that he believed Notre Dame was
not entirely forthcoming. Given that the government did not contest
Notre Dame’s sincerity, he should have consciously set aside his
suspicion, rather than slipping it rhetorically into his analysis of the other
elements of the claim.
Despite occasional examples of overt suspicion creep, and more
frequent examples of tacit suspicion creep, there are probably more
cases where the court’s suspicion influences its legal analysis sub
silentio. This form of suspicion creep is the most troubling, for it fails to
signal to other courts the role that suspicion played in the analysis. This
risks systemic doctrinal effects that disadvantage other religious
accommodation claimants.
Suspicion creep is entirely understandable. Evidence of religious
insincerity is relevant to a religious accommodation claim. Lawyers have
long known that factfinders have a difficult time ignoring relevant
evidence, even when rules of evidence place it out-of-bounds. This is
why courts routinely decide evidentiary disputes without the jury
present, to prevent evidence that is relevant, but prejudicial, from
influencing the jury. In this respect, suspicion creep is no different from
the effects of attempting to suppress any relevant evidence. A court that
does not directly consider sincerity is nevertheless likely to be
influenced by evidence of insincerity.
The procedural rules, too, contribute to suspicion creep. Because
sincerity is a question of fact, not of law, courts are unlikely to resolve a
case on sincerity before trial. On a motion to dismiss, the court will
presume that the claimant’s alleged religious sincerity is true.169 On a
motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, the court will
168. See Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 628 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (“Yet the majority here
sides with HHS, and ‘in effect tell[s] the plaintiff[] that [its] beliefs are flawed.’” (quoting Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014))).
169. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2017 10:07 AM

1220

[Vol. 92:1185

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

construe the evidence in favor of the plaintiff’s sincerity.170 The vast
majority of cases are decided before trial, with a judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment.171 Moreover, the government often (but
not always) concedes a claimant’s sincerity. The result is that trial courts
rarely have an occasion to directly address the claimant’s sincerity, even
when the pleadings or evidence give rise to a suspicion of insincerity.
Appellate courts, in turn, usually restrict themselves to reviewing the
trial court’s decisions; when the trial court made no decision about the
claimant’s sincerity, the appellate court has no occasion to review it.
Even when a court has determined that a religious accommodation
claimant has carried the burden of showing religious sincerity by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court may still have some doubt
about it. A fifty-one percent chance of sincerity is sufficient to satisfy
the legal standard, but it is unlikely to keep a court from allowing the
forty-nine percent chance of insincerity to influence its legal analysis.
All of these practicalities of adjudication help to explain why suspicion
creep occurs, but they do not justify it. In fact, suspicion creep may be
especially unfair when a litigant has not been obligated to establish
sincerity because the opponent did not contest it or because the court
decided the case on the pleadings (or both).
Avoiding concerns about insincerity does not make the issue go away;
it transforms it, submerges it, and raises rule-of-law problems.172 As the
next two Parts of this Article explain, when courts confront suspicious
religious claims, they should either address them head-on in a manner
consistent with the no-orthodoxy principle, or self-consciously avoid
allowing those suspicions to affect their legal analysis of whether the
claimant’s exercise is “religious” and whether the government regulation
“substantially burdens” it. Both of these are legal questions for the court
to determine, quite apart from the factual question about whether the
claimant sincerely believes what he or she claims to believe.
2.

A Flood of Insincere Claims

Systematically ignoring religious sincerity out of a concern that
adjudicating it would run afoul of the no-orthodoxy principle can also

170. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
171. See VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT ch. 1 (2007).
172. See Brady, supra note 11, at 1450 (“It is troubling that courts might be relying on
unexpressed sincerity tests . . . . If sincerity is the determinative issue in RFRA and RLUIPA cases,
courts should address the issue openly—not through implicit and imperfect proxies.”).
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limit religious liberty by giving the government a good reason to deny
religious accommodations: the risk of insincere claims.
Once a claimant has established that a government regulation places a
substantial burden on her sincere religious exercise, the government
must show that the regulation is the least restrictive means of
accomplishing a compelling government interest. One way for the
government to meet this burden is to show that there would be so many
legitimate demands for a religious accommodation that those
accommodations would completely undermine the regulation.173 This
concern is entirely legitimate. Sometimes, however, a court will go
further—it will consider the costs of insincere claims that might result
from granting an accommodation for a sincere one.
Consider United States v. Adeyemo.174 The government indicted the
defendant for importing leopard skins without a permit and without
declaring them.175 The defendant asserted a defense to prosecution under
RFRA.176 According to the defendant, the non-importation law
substantially burdened his use of leopard skins in the exercise of his
Santeria religious beliefs.177 The government issues permits for
importing leopard skins, but not for religious reasons.178 The court
determined that the government had carried its burden of showing that
religious accommodations from the non-importation law would
undermine its compelling interest in protecting leopards.179 The court
listed several reasons. One of them was that there are enough Santerians
in the United States who might want leopard skins that issuing permits
on religious grounds would lead to the eradication of the species.180 This
may be an entirely legitimate concern. It goes to the heart of the
government’s compelling interest in not allowing a particular religious
accommodation.181
173. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying a Free Exercise
accommodation from social security taxes partly on the ground that the government had a high
interest in avoiding a flood of indistinguishable religious accommodation claims that would
undermine the federal tax system).
174. 624 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
175. Id. at 1091–92.
176. Id. at 1084.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1085.
179. Id. at 1089–90.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1091–92 (stating the government must have compelling interest in not allowing this
accommodation of not allowing a religious exception to importing leopard skins, as opposed to a
compelling interest in general).

06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2017 10:07 AM

1222

[Vol. 92:1185

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

The court went on, however, to agree with the government that
allowing sincere religious accommodations would also encourage phony
claims, which would be difficult to administer and may further decimate
the species.182 An accommodation may give rise to insincere claims, but
the challenge of restricting insincere claims should not counsel against
an accommodation for sincere ones.183 As explained in Part IV, the
government can sort out insincere claims. A speculative risk of false
claimants and the administrative costs of outing them should not defeat a
sincere claim unless, perhaps, “actual experience proved [false claims]
to be a substantial obstacle” to the government’s compelling interests.184
C.

Distrusting Religious Liberty

Ignoring religious sincerity may have another important cost. When
the government gives a pass to those who insincerely claim the benefits
of religious liberty, it erodes the value of that liberty in the eyes of the
public.
What could be a more powerful illustration of this phenomenon than
the John Oliver sketch discussed at the beginning of this Article? Oliver
sought to parody religious fraudsters precisely to illustrate that U.S.
religious liberty law is too lax. In a sense, he ridiculed not only scam
artists, but religious liberty itself. Perhaps Oliver’s misperception of the
sincerity requirement is widely shared. But the misperception that
religious liberty entails the protection of phony religious claims
undermines public support for the protection of sincere ones. Such a
conclusion by the public is only sensible: if “religious liberty” inoculates
fraudulent claims, perhaps we should rethink it. Eroding support for
religious liberty altogether is a high price to pay simply because it is
believed that courts cannot be trusted to weed out insincere claims.
As the next Part explains, all of the foregoing costs that arise from
ignoring religious sincerity—to others, to doctrine, and to religious
liberty itself—are avoidable. Courts may adjudicate religious sincerity
without running afoul of the Constitution’s no-orthodoxy principle.

182. Id. at 1092.
183. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 14, at 53.
184. Giannella, supra note 14, at 1416; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)
(“[I]t is highly doubtful whether such evidence [of the possibility of fraudulent claims] would be
sufficient to warrant a substantial infringement of religious liberties.”); Pepper, supra note 21, at
328.
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IV. THREADING THE NEEDLE
Courts lack clear direction about the nuts and bolts of adjudicating
religious sincerity.185 This Part explains how courts may adjudicate
religious sincerity without violating the no-orthodoxy principle. They
should evaluate religious sincerity just as they would any other mental
state, with one important caveat: they should avoid inferring insincerity
from implausibility. Otherwise, courts should adjudicate religious
sincerity subject to the ordinary rules of procedure and evidence, and
should carefully weigh evidence of ulterior motive, personal
inconsistency, and idiosyncrasy.
A.

Burden of Proof

A religious accommodation claimant usually bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her religious exercise is
based on a sincere religious belief. To avoid running afoul of the noorthodoxy principle, some scholars suggest that courts should raise the
burden of proof186 and shift it to the opponent.187 This would be a major
exception to the rules of procedure and evidence, one the Constitution
simply does not require.188
A religious accommodation claimant must usually show sincerity by a
preponderance of the evidence.189 Sincerity is a question of fact.190 As a
practical matter, the burden on the plaintiff depends on the motion

185. See BRADY, supra note 20, at 204 (“The feasibility of a judicially enforceable right of
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause will depend on formulating a workable, fair, and properly
limited approach to sincerity questions.”); Adams & Barmore, supra note 7, at 65 (“Even when
weighing the sincerity of individual religious beliefs, ‘[c]ourts are often unclear about which party
bears the burden of proof and what evidence is permissible.’”); Brady, supra note 11, at 1433
(“[C]ourts have not developed a formal sincerity test in RFRA and RLUIPA cases.”).
186. See BRADY, supra note 20, at 282 (arguing that “courts should look for a clear and
unmistakable discrepancy between the believer’s claims and their [sic] behavior before concluding
that their [sic] claims are insincere”).
187. See id. at 283 (“A heightened evidentiary requirement also reduces the risk of
discriminatory decision making more broadly.”); Brady, supra note 11, at 1455–56.
188. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 21, at 328.
189. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (“In addition to showing that
the relevant exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief, petitioner also bore
the burden of proving that the Department’s grooming policy substantially burdened that exercise of
religion.”). One exception is the bankruptcy code, which essentially creates a presumption of
sincerity for a pre-bankruptcy charitable transfer that is less than fifteen percent of income, or
“consistent with the practices of the debtor in making charitable contributions.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2) (2012).
190. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
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before the court and whether the opponent has contested sincerity.191 On
a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true
and determines whether the plaintiff’s claim can be dismissed solely on
legal grounds.192 The court does not adjudicate the plaintiff’s sincerity.
On a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court construes the
evidence in favor of the plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether there
is a genuine issue of material fact worthy of going to trial.193 Unless the
defendant has presented evidence of insincerity and the plaintiff has
failed to present any credible evidence of sincerity, the court will likely
not enter summary judgment on that ground.194 If the opponent never
contests sincerity, then the claimant, having put some evidence of
sincerity into the record, has established it as a matter of law (regardless
the stage of litigation). As a practical matter, therefore, before trial, the
rules of procedure ordinarily favor a claimant’s allegations of sincerity
and presentation of some evidence of sincerity.195
Some scholars have argued that the burden should shift in
accommodation cases, requiring the opponent to establish that the
claimant is insincere.196 Some have also suggested that the standard of
proof ought to be higher than normal. Professor Kathleen Brady, for
instance, argues that “courts should look for clear and unmistakable
discrepancy between the believer’s claims and their behavior before
concluding that their claims are insincere.”197 According to Brady, “[a]
heightened evidentiary requirement . . . reduces the risk of
discriminatory decision making . . . . A narrowly tailored inquiry with a
demanding standard of proof leaves less room for judges to equate

191. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428–30
(2006) (discussing the pretrial burdens of proof under RFRA).
192. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
193. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
194. EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de P. R.,
279 F.3d 49, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2002); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1352–53 (10th
Cir. 1997).
195. The pretrial procedure does not change the claimant’s burden when the claimant moves for
judgment before trial or at trial. The plaintiff must still establish sincerity by a preponderance of the
evidence.
196. See BRADY, supra note 20, at 282 (arguing that courts should require “clear and
unmistakable evidence of insincerity,” which means that the burden is on the opponent to present
such evidence). But see Riga, supra note 21, at 260 (“[S]ince Free Exercise claims are proper to the
individual alone, it is fair and equitable to place the burden of sincerity upon him and not upon the
government.”).
197. BRADY, supra note 20, at 282.
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assertions that they view as kooky or implausible with claims that are
insincere.”198
Brady’s constitutional concern is well placed, but her proposed
remedy is unnecessary. The most precise way to prevent courts from
violating the no-orthodoxy principle is to prohibit them from inferring
insincerity from implausibility. Although constitutional and common
law doctrines occasionally overprotect constitutional rights, courts
should also take the costs of overprotection into account. In this case,
requiring the opponent to prove insincerity would be inconsistent with
an array of statutory regimes. It would also make it harder to weed out
and thereby reduce the costs of insincere claims. An approach more
tailored to the contours of the no-orthodoxy principle would neutralize
Brady’s concerns without violating the Constitution.
B.

The Caveat: No Inferring Insincerity from Inaccuracy

Although the Supreme Court has stated that “any fact which casts
doubt on the veracity of the [selective service] registrant is relevant,”199
as discussed in Part II above, the no-orthodoxy principle demands an
important caveat. Courts may not evaluate the “truth” of one’s religious
claims. In determining religious sincerity, what this means is that courts
may neither determine as a factual matter that a religious claim is
inaccurate, nor infer from a claim’s apparent inaccuracy or
implausibility that the claimant is insincere. This section provides a
conceptual distinction between accuracy and sincerity, explains that
courts and factfinders routinely distinguish between these concepts, and
shows briefly how courts can protect against inferring insincerity from
inaccuracy, steering clear of the no-orthodoxy principle.
1.

Distinguishing Accuracy and Sincerity

Whether a religious belief is accurate is different from whether it is
sincerely held. Accuracy and sincerity are both aspects of what
philosopher Bernard Williams has called “truthfulness”—they overlap,
but they are distinct.200 Accuracy describes the correspondence between
a statement (or a belief) and the object of that statement or belief. The
accuracy of a statement is subject to empirical study. Whether a
statement is in fact accurate is different from whether the speaker

198. Id. at 283.
199. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955) (emphasis added).
200. See WILLIAMS, supra note 94.
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actually believes what she asserts or claims to believe, i.e., whether the
speaker is sincere. To oversimplify, perhaps, accuracy depends on the
statement’s correspondence to observable reality external to the speaker.
Sincerity depends on the statement’s correspondence to the speaker’s
subjective belief.
Both are crucial aspects of truthfulness, and the habits and abilities
that help one become more adept at speaking accurately overlap with
those that help one to become more adept at speaking sincerely. But the
accuracy of a statement and the speaker’s sincerity are nonetheless
distinguishable. Suppose a speaker says, “that car is blue.” The speaker
is colorblind; the car is green. The speaker believes that the statement is
accurate. The speaker is sincere, but the statement is inaccurate.
Suppose again that the colorblind speaker says, “the car is blue.” And
the car is blue. But this time the speaker believes it is green. He only
said the car was blue to tease his young niece who is trying to learn her
colors. (Admittedly a game to which the colorblind are not well suited.)
Here we have the inverse of the prior hypothetical. The speaker is
insincere (he believes the car is green) but the statement is nonetheless
accurate (the car actually is blue).
This all seems fairly straightforward as applied to the color of a car. It
gets somewhat more complicated as applied to religious beliefs, for an
accommodation claim ordinarily entails beliefs not only about religion,
but also about religious morality. A claimant could be inaccurate or
insincere, or both, about either one. Under the no-orthodoxy principle,
the government may not adjudicate the accuracy of the claimant’s
religious views, or the accuracy of the claimant’s religious beliefs,
whether they are about religious doctrine or religiously influenced
morality. It may, though, adjudicate the claimant’s sincerity as to either.
Consider the following example. A prisoner claims that his religion
forbids him from cutting his beard, so he is entitled to an
accommodation from the prison’s no-beard policy. Here, there are two
levels of potential inaccuracy. Most broadly, the claimant’s religion may
inaccurately describe God and God’s commands. For instance, suppose
the religion is theistic and, in fact, there is no God. Or the religion may
be a variant of Christianity and in fact, perhaps, Jesus Christ was not in
any way divine. And so on. It seems fairly settled and noncontroversial
that the government may not determine that the claimant’s religion, or
any of its theological claims, is inaccurate. Nor, as I have suggested,
may the government infer that the claimant is insincere simply because
his claimed belief is either inaccurate or implausible.
Another possible inaccuracy arises, however. What if the claimant is
simply inaccurate about whether his religion actually forbids him from
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shaving his beard? Maybe he sincerely believes it does, but he is simply
wrong. No one else who shares his religious beliefs agrees with him.
And there appears to be no ordinary logic that would lead someone to
conclude, based on whatever authorities dictate his religious morality,
that the religion forbids an adherent from shaving. Suppose the reason
this particular adherent believes his religion forbids beard-shaving is
because its holy texts forbid touching another person’s hair trimmings,
and from this prohibition the adherent has determined that he cannot
make it easier for someone else to violate this prohibition by shaving his
beard and sending the trimmings on their merry way.
All of this—the clear prohibition, the adherent’s reasoning, and the
adherent’s conscientious conclusion—are likewise questions of religious
accuracy, beyond a court’s ken. Whether the belief accurately reflects
the best understanding of the religion would require the government to
determine the best understanding of that religion, something the noorthodoxy principle flatly prohibits. So too with whether the claimant’s
moral reasoning, or conscientious judgment on the basis of that
reasoning, reflects either the community’s beliefs or an accurate mode of
moral reasoning. Some may find it unfortunate, from a theological,
social, or cultural perspective, that the no-orthodoxy principle tolerates
religious atomism. But it does. With respect to religious accuracy—
including accuracy about what the claimant’s religion requires—each
person is an island.201
None of this, however, means that the government may not question
whether the claimant sincerely believes that his religion forbids him
from shaving his beard. And if the claimant cannot demonstrate that he
sincerely believes this, the law does not require the government to
permit an accommodation.
Much of the above is fairly well established in law, even though the
Supreme Court justices sometimes appear to be confused about it. I have
merely suggested a subtle change in language that should help to clarify
the concepts. The government may adjudicate religious sincerity, but not
religious accuracy or plausibility, understood as the likelihood that a
belief or statement is accurate. My proposed contribution is simple: in
the course of adjudicating religious sincerity, the government should
avoid inferring insincerity from evidence of inaccuracy or implausibility.
This notion is not entirely new,202 but the forgoing distinction between
sincerity and accuracy should make it clearer.
201. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981).
202. Adams & Barmore, supra note 7, at 64 (“Provided that courts take care that their test for
sincerity is truly one for fraud, not verity or centrality, placing this limit on RFRA claims will best
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Sincerity and Accuracy in Law

The distinction between sincerity and accuracy is not otherwise
foreign to American law. Substantive law often distinguishes between
sincerity and accuracy. Criminal law,203 tort,204 securities regulation,205
and professional responsibility rules,206 for instance, all distinguish
between negligent misrepresentation (inaccuracy) and knowing fraud
(inaccuracy and insincerity). In general, evidence that the speaker was
aware that his statements were false increases the punishment or
liability, so litigants and courts often have reason to carefully distinguish
between inaccuracy and insincerity.207
Routine trial practice, too, requires judges and juries to distinguish
between accuracy and sincerity. One thing that sets the common law
system apart is the reliance on witness testimony rather than written
answers to interrogatories.208 One of the justifications for this difference
is the belief that the probative value of testimony depends in part on the
speaker’s credibility, which is easier to judge in person through the realtime adversarial process.209 Factfinders facing inconsistent testimony
thus have to distinguish not only between the accuracy of the respective
witnesses, but their sincerity.210 To be sure, witnesses can sincerely
disagree, leaving nothing for the factfinder to do but to determine, based
effectuate Congress’s intent.”); McConnell, supra note 14, at 37 (noting that “the government can
adopt screening devices designed to separate faith from fraud” “so long as the government confines
its inquiry to the sincerity—as distinguished from the truth—of the individual’s professed beliefs”);
see also EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 106 (“The sincerity approach [under Canadian constitutional
law] takes seriously the problems of authenticity by establishing the authenticity of a practice on the
basis of evidence that can be reliably assessed but which steers clear of contentious considerations
of doctrinal requirements of a religion.”).
203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (providing a gradient of measuring a
defendant’s culpability ranging from “purposely” to “negligently”).
204. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (defining
negligent misrepresentation), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(defining fraudulent misrepresentation requiring intent).
205. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (making it unlawful to commit fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (stating “scienter is an
element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”).
206. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (noting “fraud” requires
a purpose or intent to deceive).
207. See supra notes 203–06.
208. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373–74 (1768).
209. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 246 (2003).
210. See, e.g., Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[A]ssessing a claimant’s
sincerity of [religious] belief demands a full exposition of facts and the opportunity for the
factfinder to observe the claimant’s demeanor during direct and cross-examination.”).
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on other evidence, which account is more accurate. But often factfinders
discount the testimony of witnesses they perceive to be insincere. So the
conceptual compartmentalization of accuracy and sincerity, though
perhaps unusual in ordinary life, is typical in law. The constitutional rule
prohibiting courts from adjudicating the accuracy of religious claims but
permitting the adjudication of religious sincerity is an outlier for
prohibiting the one but not the other, but not for distinguishing between
them.
3.

Limiting the Factfinder’s Use of Evidence of Inaccuracy

A number of scholars have urged that prohibiting the adjudication of
religious accuracy is not enough—courts should also avoid adjudicating
religious sincerity whenever possible. The reason is that evidence of
plausibility is ordinarily probative of sincerity. The more implausible a
factfinder believes the religious belief to be, the harder it will be for the
factfinder to conclude that the claimant actually believes it.
The remedy is too much. Courts should admit all evidence probative
of sincerity, other than evidence of religious inaccuracy or
implausibility. If the factfinder is a jury, an instruction to the effect that
the jury should not base its view of the claimant’s sincerity on its own
view of the plausibility of the beliefs should suffice. The rules of
evidence allow courts to admit evidence to show one thing but not
another, and judges give limiting instructions all the time.211 In fact, the
trial court’s proposed jury instructions in Ballard were not all that
bad.212
Professor William Marshall has noted “at least some tension”
between this reading of Ballard and Employment Division v. Smith.213 In
211. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (stating the court must restrict evidence if it is admissible for one
purpose but not another).
212. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1944) (“As far as this Court sees the
issue, it is immaterial what these defendants preached or wrote or taught in their classes. They are
not going to be permitted to speculate on the actuality of the happening of those incidents. Now, I
think I have made that as clear as I can. Therefore, the religious beliefs of these defendants cannot
be an issue in this court. The issue is: Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those
things? If they did, they should be acquitted. I cannot make it any clearer than that.”). Judge Noonan
suggests that Ballard effectively prohibits a claimant from testifying that his religious beliefs are
accurate. See Noonan, supra note 18, at 718. I don’t believe Ballard requires this result. Ballard
prohibits prosecution for inaccurate or implausible religious claims. I see no reason why a party
could not testify about the content of his belief—indeed, he may have to do so to establish sincerity.
And of course a sincere claimant will believe that his claims are accurate. What neither the claimant
nor the opponent may do is attempt to establish the accuracy of the claims (a factual judgment ruled
out by the no-orthodoxy principle) to show the claims are sincere.
213. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); William P. Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and the Religious Inquiry
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Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an
accommodation from a neutral and generally applicable law.214
Exempting claimants (and fraud defendants) from neutral and generally
applicable rules of evidence—like the rule that one may infer insincerity
from evidence of implausibility—seems to be inconsistent with Smith.215
As Marshall notes, though, the Ballard rule is distinguishable from
Smith because it seeks to promote additional concerns about
“government prosecution of unpopular religious beliefs” and the
government’s incompetence “to decide religious issues.”216 I would go
further. As in Hosanna-Tabor,217 the Ballard rule does not conflict with
Smith because it arises not only from the Free Exercise Clause, but also
from the Establishment Clause. Both clauses (and others besides) lend
their weight and rationale to the no-orthodoxy principle, of which the
Ballard rule is one instantiation.
Finally, some object to putting a claimant’s sincerity to a jury on the
ground that a jury is more likely than a judge to be biased against
unusual religions.218 Therefore, the argument goes, adjudicating sincerity
by jury trial would particularly disadvantage adherents of unusual
minority religions.219
The objection about jury bias is unproven. The most recent empirical
studies, though not directly on point, call it into question. Jury pools tend
to be more diverse than the corps of professional judges, and therefore
more likely to identify with a wider array of claimants than judges as a
whole. Moreover, any given jury is certain to be more diverse, just by
virtue of numbers, than any given judge.220 Unsurprisingly, therefore,
recent empirical studies suggest that juries are more likely than judges to
side with victims of unconstitutional conduct than with the
Exception to the Criminal Law, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 239, 256 (2011).
214. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
215. See also Mason, supra note 63, at 117–18 (arguing that “the constitutional prohibition on
finding ‘religious beliefs’ to be ‘false’ must refer to the non-literal functions served, in context, by
religious propositions” for Ballard to comply with Smith).
216. Marshall, supra note 213, at 257.
217. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).
218. See, e.g., Krotozynski, supra note 17, at 1085 (“If pervasive social prejudice against new,
oddball religions and religionists is a social fact, then protecting belief requires more than simply
refraining from submitting the truth of a religion’s tenets to a jury.”); Lupu, supra note 17, at 955
(“The bias built into standards of sincerity is aggravated by the allocation of functions in the judicial
process.”); Noonan, supra note 18, at 719 (“Is a jury capable of discerning when the use of a symbol
is insincere and hypocritical?”).
219. See Krotozynski, supra note 17, at 1085.
220. See Nathan S. Chapman, The Jury’s Constitutional Judgment, 67 ALA. L. REV. 189, 237–39
(2015).
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government.221 While I am aware of no empirical studies about the
adjudication of religious sincerity, based on the evidence that is
available to religious accommodation claimants and their lawyers, it is
not obvious that they would opt for a bench trial.
Some might respond to the concern about jury bias by pointing to the
constitutional fact doctrine, by which an appellate court reviews de novo
the facts relevant to a constitutional judgment. Some courts have
extended the doctrine to justify de novo review of facts relevant to a
statutory religious accommodation case.222 The constitutional fact
doctrine should not justify de novo review of a claimant’s sincerity. In
the first place, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow appellate
courts to review de novo the credibility of a witness,223 a task that would
likely be central to reviewing many adjudications of religious sincerity.
More fundamentally, the doctrine is unprincipled and should be
discarded. As I have argued elsewhere, a doctrine born of legitimate
concern about southern bias against the speech rights of civil rights
activists in one case224 has unfortunately become a power-grab whenever
it suits federal appellate courts.225
C.

Evaluating Religious Sincerity

Putting aside evidence of a religious belief’s accuracy, there are three
categories of evidence that are relevant to a claimant’s sincerity:
nonreligious incentives for a claimant to make an insincere religious
claim; evidence that the claimant’s current religious claims do not “fit”
with the claimant’s religious biography; and evidence that the claimant’s
religious claims do not “fit” with the claimant’s religious community.226
1.

Insincerity Incentives

Evidence that the accommodation sought by a claimant would be
attractive to anyone, not just to religious objectors, may be powerful
221. See Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the SpeechConduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837
(2009).
222. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 948 (10th Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.).
223. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
224. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
225. Chapman, supra note 220, at 228–35.
226. See Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981)
(summarizing a religious sincerity analysis that accords with the overview here); Senn, supra note
8, at 342 (cataloguing types of evidence relevant to adjudicating religious sincerity).
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evidence of insincerity.227 Classic examples include financial windfalls
and avoiding the danger of serving in the armed forces.228 Some
conscientious objector cases involve both.229 American law has
frequently tried to reduce incentives for insincere religious
accommodation claims by requiring accommodated parties to perform
alternative service.230 Such structural mechanisms can reduce the
likelihood of insincere claims, and therefore the likelihood that a
government official will have to inquire into a claimant’s sincerity, but
they cannot foreclose insincere claims altogether.
It is important to keep in mind that many religious accommodations
do not give the accommodated party a benefit that would be attractive to
everyone (or even to most people).231 The theoretical justification for a
religious accommodation is that it removes a unique burden on those
with a conflicting religious commitment, not that it provides them with a
special benefit for having a religious belief.232 Hobby Lobby, for
instance, did not stand to profit financially from declining to pay for
employee insurance plans that covered certain forms of contraceptives;
rather, the government argued that the plans virtually paid for
themselves because the contraceptives would lower the overall cost of
women’s healthcare.233 Likewise, few parents would prefer their
adolescent children to work at home rather than to go to school, as the
Amish parents sought in Wisconsin v. Yoder.234 And this is to say
nothing of the costs—financial, emotional, and otherwise—entailed in

227. See Adams & Barmore, supra note 7, at 65.
228. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (mail fraud); Ideal Life Church of Lake
Elmo v. Washington County, 304 N.W.2d 308, 318 (Minn. 1981) (“The court found that the
primary, and perhaps the sole, purpose for incorporating the Ideal Life Church was to provide the
Rossow family with the benefit of a tax-free home while maintaining the same use and control they
had prior to incorporation.”); David Bernstein, Miami Is Worth a Mass?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Aug. 7, 2009) http://volokh.com/2009/08/07/miami-is-worth-a-mass/ [https://perma.cc/F5TRML32] (arguing that religious asylum may pose “a substantial risk of false conversions” and “a
huge benefit being given to Iranians (and likely citizens of some other Muslim countries) who
become Christian that is not given to Iranians who stay Muslim”).
229. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 383 (1955) (claimant first claimed an
exemption from the draft as a farmer, then as a conscientious objector, probably because he
(understandably) didn’t want to exchange the financial benefits of tending the family farm for the
costs of serving in the armed forces).
230. See GREENAWALT, supra note 17, at 122–23; McConnell, supra note 14, at 37.
231. BRADY, supra note 20, at 203, 280.
232. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 688 (1992).
233. See Adams & Barmore, supra note 7, at 65.
234. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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going to the trouble to seek a religious accommodation. The specter of
litigation alone could deter the fainthearted, much less the false.
In some cases, it is difficult to judge whether the accommodation
would come packaged with a benefit that might be desirable to the
insincere. Prisoners, for instance, may be less deterred by litigation, and
may have a powerful incentive to request an accommodation to annoy or
retaliate against prison officials.235 On the other hand, prisoners often
request, and receive, religious accommodations that are not obviously
universally desirable, especially related to dietary restrictions and
fasts.236
A word of caution about ulterior motives for religious claims is in
order. Many litigants, in all kinds of cases, have multiple motives for
bringing suit. To put it more precisely, they have multiple objectives and
goals that they hope the suit will help them to realize—revenge,
compensation, justice, the opportunity to tell their story, etc. Religious
accommodation claimants may have multiple motives too. Evidence of
multiple motives may or may not bear on whether the claimant is sincere
about her religious exercise. Take Hobby Lobby, for instance. Suppose
that the Green family that owns and controls Hobby Lobby had a range
of motives for challenging the contraceptive mandate: they like free
advertising; they are publicity hounds; they dislike President Obama;
they dislike “socialized medicine”; they believe America should
generally promote “pro-life” values; they don’t think anyone should ever
use abortifacients, and they want to reduce the risk that anyone will; and
they believe that it would violate their religion for their company to pay
for contraceptive insurance for its employees. The last of these motives
is the only one that matters for purposes of satisfying the sincerity
requirement. Evidence of another motive may suggest a reason the
claimant might lie about his religious exercise. But so long as the
claimant establishes that he is sincere about his religious exercise, any
other motives he may have for seeking an accommodation are legally
beside the point.

235. See Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Evidence of nonobservance is
relevant on the question of sincerity, and is especially important in the prison setting, for an inmate
may adopt a religion merely to harass the prison staff with demands to accommodate his new
faith.”).
236. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 182 (4th Cir. 2006) (involving an accommodation
from ordinary prison meal schedules so Muslim prisoners could fast from food during daylight in
observance of Ramadan). Some prisoners would prefer a kosher diet, by contrast, simply because
the food may be healthier or of a higher quality than the non-kosher prison food.
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Moreover, many people don’t differentiate between their religious,
social, political, cultural, and personal ethical beliefs.237 As John Locke
noted long ago, all of these factors inform one’s conscience.238 Probably
a number of religious accommodation claims arise from a conscientious
objection shaped by multiple cultural influences, including religion.
Most people are not trained philosophers or theologians, and they don’t
have the time, interest, or intellectual resources to distinguish between
beliefs compelled by their religion and the moral norms of their social
network. For practical purposes, the two are one and the same for most
people—maybe for everyone. I doubt that the sources of one’s
conscientious judgments can be disentangled by anyone, let alone courts.
Courts can determine whether a claimant holds her beliefs sincerely, and
whether a source of those beliefs is religion.239 But they should be
reluctant to dive into a claimant’s moral commitments to show that the
claimant’s objection arises not from a sincere religious belief, but from
being planted in front of Sesame Street as a child.
2.

Narrative Fit Evidence

The most powerful evidence of religious insincerity may be evidence
that claimants have stated or acted inconsistently with their alleged
religious beliefs.240 A recorded statement by the claimant that he plans to
manufacture a religious belief for purposes of litigation is, of course,
pure gold. But short of that, evidence that the claimant has shifted
religious views, apparently for purposes of litigation, is powerful.241
Courts should be thoughtful about how they evaluate evidence of
inconsistent conduct or statements, though. People change over time.
Their religious beliefs change. What good is religious liberty if one can’t
exercise it to change religious beliefs and conduct? Moreover, few live
up to their ideals, whether they derive from religion or not. Many
237. Thanks to Hillel Levin for raising this point.
238. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. I, ch. 3, § 8, at 66
(Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (1690); see also Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and
Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1489–90.
239. See infra section V.A.
240. See BRADY, supra note 20, at 281 (arguing that courts should “carefully tailor the questions
that judges can ask and focus the inquiry on whether the individual’s free exercise claims are
consistent with their overall conduct during the period of the dispute”).
241. See, e.g., Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1963) (requiring
appellant, member of the Reform Jewish faith, to proceed with trial after sundown on a Friday did
not violate his religious liberty because “the trial court learned from appellant that he actually went
to his office and worked on Saturdays” and he had declined to object to resetting the trial “for that
day and hour”).
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religions account for failure or sin, as well as repentance and
forgiveness. Common experience, then, suggests that what courts (and
claimants) ought to be primarily concerned about is not whether the
claimant’s conduct and statements have always been a model of
consistency, but whether the claimant’s asserted religious beliefs make
sense with, or fit into, the claimant’s religious biography. If there are
inconsistencies, a claimant may present evidence that accounts for them
as expressions of religious exercise, such as conversion,
“backsliding,”242 or good old-fashioned failure. Evidence that the current
religious claim does not “fit” with the claimant’s religious narrative
ought to weigh against the claimant’s sincerity.243
A couple of cases are illustrative. In Witmer v. United States,244 the
Supreme Court reviewed a denial of conscientious objector status.245 In
his questionnaire, Witmer had requested an agricultural classification so
he could continue working on his father’s farm and “bring more of [it]
under cultivation and closed.”246 “For this reason,” he wrote, “I am
appealing to you to grant me an agricultural classification as I assure you
that I will increase production year after year, and contribute a
satisfactory amount for the war effort and civilian use.”247 He “expressly
disclaimed any ministerial exemption.”248 He did, however, claim to be a
conscientious objector, stating that he was “required to maintain
neutrality in the ‘combats of this world.’”249 He said he had never “given
public expression to his conscientious objector views,” but he “claimed
that he had demonstrated his convictions by studying the Bible and by
telling others about God’s Kingdom and ‘of how He will put a stop to all
wars.’”250
When his local Selective Service Board denied his claim for
classification as a farmer and conscientious objector, he offered a
variation on this theme. He appealed the decision and requested
classification as “a minister of the gospel.”251 The Appeal Board met
242. See generally Brady, supra note 11.
243. See Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988).
244. 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
245. The Court reviewed the decision of the Selective Service System for whether it had any
basis in fact. Id. at 381; see also Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946).
246. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 378.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 379.
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with Witmer. He told them he had left his job of three years at a hat
factory. He presented an affidavit of a local officer of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses that he had engaged in the “preaching of the good news or
gospel to others” “on many occasions,” stated that he carried Bibles and
study aids from door to door, and said that “one could be ordained as a
minister of the Jehovah’s Witnesses without attending a seminary or
performing funeral or marriage ceremonies.”252 In response to the
prospect of serving as a noncombatant, he stated that he believed “the
boy who makes the snow balls is just as responsible as the boy who
throws them.”253 This claim was inconsistent with his initial “offer to
contribute to the war effort” by running his father’s farm. 254 Despite
Witmer’s seeming religious sincerity in general, the government
concluded that his inconsistent statements about ministry and about
helping the war effort suggested that his religious pacifism was not
thoroughgoing enough to support conscientious objector status.255
Applying a “some evidence” standard, the Supreme Court upheld the
classification.256
Witmer’s case was a close call. Given his prior inconsistent
statements, there was nothing wrong with requiring him to explain
whether his prior statements were in conflict, in his mind, with his
current claim, and if so, how they both fit into a coherent religious
biography. Without stronger evidence of narrative fit, the board was
justified in concluding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving
his religious sincerity (even if it would have been justified in concluding
the opposite).
A more recent case arising under RFRA also illustrates the value of
narrative fit evidence. In United States v. Adeyamo,257 the defendant
sought to quash an indictment against him for importing leopard skins
without a permit and without declaring them.258 He claimed that he used
the skins for religious purposes as an adherent of a mixture of “the
Yoruba religions and Catholicism.”259 He purported to believe “in the
power of the Orisha known as Shango, and that he was intending to use

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id. at 382–83.
Id. at 383.
624 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1086.
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all of the seized leopard skins for a religious initiation ceremony.” 260 He
also submitted declarations from experts to show that possessing and
using leopard skins are consistent with the Yoruba religion.261
To counter Adeyamo’s story, the government produced evidence that
Adeyamo “stated to investigators that he was Catholic, and that he
believed in Jesus Christ.”262 While that, alone, might suggest only that
Adeyamo was an adherent of Santeria or another syncretistic variant of
Christianity and an animistic religion, the government’s other evidence
was more damning. According to Adeyamo’s “purported friend,”
Adeyamo appeared to “despise[] the Santeria religion.”263 Adeyamo “did
sell African items to individuals in the United States who practiced the
Santeria religion but as soon as the sale was over, [he] physically moved
away from these individuals to the other side of the room because he
disliked the faith.”264 When Adeyamo’s friend stayed with him in
Nigeria, Adeyamo “did not practice the Santeria religion nor a mixture
of the Catholic and Santeria religion, but instead performed only
Catholic services in his house.”265 On the basis of the conflicting
evidence about Adeyamo’s religious consistency, the district court
concluded that it could not determine Adeyamo’s sincerity without
personally assessing Adeyamo’s credibility in an evidentiary hearing.266
Since the court dismissed his motion on other grounds, there was no
need for such a hearing.267 The court and the government were right to
question Adeyamo’s religious sincerity given the evidence of his
inconsistent past practice and statements.
3.

Community Fit Evidence

More controversially, I suggest that courts should also consider
evidence about whether the claimant’s alleged religious beliefs fit with
the beliefs of the claimant’s religious community. Relying solely on
such evidence to conclude that a claimant is insincere would effectively
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1087.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. The court dismissed Adeyamo’s motion on the ground that, assuming his sincerity, the
government had satisfied its burden under RFRA to show that declining to accommodate religious
objectors was the least restrictive way of achieving its compelling interest in protecting endangered
leopards. Id.
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favor mainstream religious beliefs, violating the no-orthodoxy
principle.268 But allowing evidence that the claimant’s alleged beliefs are
one-of-a-kind to supplement evidence that the claimant has ulterior
motives for an accommodation, or that the claimant has acted or spoken
inconsistently with the claim, reduces the no-orthodoxy concern without
ignoring salient evidence.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in a Free Exercise
Clause case.269 A Jehovah’s Witness steel worker asserted that his
religious beliefs against participating in war would not allow him to
construct tank turrets. When the worker resigned rather than perform
work that violated his conscience, the Indiana Supreme Court denied his
unemployment compensation claim on the ground that his objection was
personal and not “religious,” partly because another Jehovah’s Witness
“had no scruples about working on tank turrets.”270 The Supreme Court
disagreed. “Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among
followers of a particular creed.”271 With a nod to the “religious question”
doctrine, and therefore the no-orthodoxy principle, the Court also noted
that, “the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such
differences in relation to the Religion Clauses.”272 But the Court did not
place evidence of “community fit” completely out-of-bounds, at least for
determining whether an accommodation claimant’s belief is “religious.”
“One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the
Free Exercise Clause; but . . . the guarantee of free exercise is not
limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious
sect.”273
This analysis of evidence that some members (or the official organs)
of the claimant’s religious community hold a contrary view of the
268. See, e.g., Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[W]here unorthodox
beliefs are implicated . . . the factfinder’s temptation to merge sincerity and verity is as great as the
need to guard against this conjugation.”); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650
F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981) (“A believer’s sincerity is also evaluated in light of the religion’s size
and history . . . but this is not dispositive.”).
269. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
270. Id. at 715 (“[A]t least, such work was ‘scripturally’ acceptable.”).
271. Id.; see also Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (“It is not the place of the
courts to deny a man the right to his religion simply because he is still struggling to assimilate the
full scope of its doctrine.”).
272. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715; see also id. at 716 (“Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not
within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation.”).
273. Id. at 715–16.
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religion’s requirements is spot-on. Such evidence may be relevant, both
to show whether the claimant is motivated by religion, and whether the
claimant is actually sincere.274 But it ought rarely, if ever, to be
dispositive of sincerity. Particularly in a nation with a profoundly
“democratized” religious sociology,275 few coreligionists are likely to
believe all the same things; community beliefs and practices shape
consciences, but they don’t press them into molds.
Out of a concern that courts will favor well known religious beliefs
over idiosyncratic claims, some scholars have suggested that courts
should avoid considering the relationship of an accommodation
claimant’s beliefs and those of the claimant’s co-religionists.276 They are
concerned, rightly, with steering clear of the no-orthodoxy principle. In
my view, the danger of this is sufficiently mitigated by insisting that
courts may not rely solely on evidence that a claimant’s beliefs do not
“fit” with the claimant’s religious community. Allowing courts to
consider such evidence, which can obviously be probative of sincerity,
in addition to evidence of ulterior motives or personal inconsistency,
reduces the dangers of letting religious insincerity off the hook, and
avoids asking courts to tolerate too much cognitive dissonance.
4.

Institutional Claimants

Some religious accommodations extend to institutions. Most recently,
the Court has held that the First Amendment entitles religious
institutions to an accommodation from employment discrimination laws
that would interfere with their employment decisions about
“ministers.”277 It has also held that RFRA entitles closely-held for-profit
274. See Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The litigant’s assertion of
a view so totally foreign to the creed with which he claimed to affiliate might well lead the court to
question his sincerity.”).
275. See generally NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY
(1989).
276. BRADY, supra note 20, at 202 (“[T]he examination of whether the believer’s assertion of
burden fits with their larger system of religious belief would impermissibly entangle courts in
religious questions . . . Such determinations would involve courts in questions of religious doctrine
that would exceed their expertise and role.”); see also id. (“[W]henever the claimant’s religious
beliefs are unusual or seem implausible or unreasonable, there is a risk that the Court will find their
claims to be insincere.”); GREENAWALT, supra note 17, at 123 (“The undesirability of inquiries into
sincerity, and especially the risk of discriminatory disbelief of the unorthodox, count against
introducing a scheme of legal regulation in which officials must evaluate people’s honesty.”);
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 590 (Can.) (“Requiring proof of the
established practices of a religion to gauge the sincerity of belief diminishes the very freedom we
seek to protect.”).
277. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012).
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corporations to an accommodation from a regulation requiring it to buy
contraceptive insurance for employees.278 Should the sincerity analysis
differ for organizations?
In short, there seems to be no reason why institutions should be
treated differently for purposes of a sincerity analysis. The law,
ordinarily through institutional by-laws enforced by state law,
determines who has authority to determine an institution’s policy,
including its “religious exercise,” if any.279 Under a statute like RFRA,
the requirement is that the claimant’s religious beliefs be sincere;
responsibility for sincerity would seem to belong to whomever the law
assigns authority to determine the institution’s religious “beliefs.”
The hard question would be what to do if the law assigns
responsibility for determining an institution’s religious beliefs to
multiple people, some of whom cannot demonstrate their sincerity.
Again, the question may ordinarily be resolved by by-laws. By-laws
anticipate that officers may disagree and provide procedures for settling
those disagreements and moving forward. If a sufficient number of
officers necessary to the direct the corporation’s policy under its by-laws
hold the asserted religious beliefs sincerely, then a court should conclude
that the institution does too. In all events, the adjudication of the
institution’s sincerity should be determined according to religiouslyneutral principles of law that govern the analysis of a corporation’s
mental state in other contexts.
In summary, I have argued that courts can, and should, adjudicate
religious sincerity. They should consider evidence of ulterior motive,
personal inconsistency, and idiosyncrasy. Though evidence of
inaccuracy (and implausibility) is probative of insincerity, as Justice
Jackson argued, it should be ruled out by the no-orthodoxy principle.
The final part of this paper explores the conceptual relationship between
sincerity and other components of a religious accommodation claim,
including the “substantial burden” element that divided the justices in
Hobby Lobby.

278. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014).
279. See id. at 2775 (“State corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by,
for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. Courts will turn to
that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes.” (citations omitted)).
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DISENTANGLING “SINCERITY,” “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE,”
AND “SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN”

So far, this Article has focused on how courts should adjudicate
religious sincerity. It now explores one way courts should not adjudicate
religious sincerity—by confusing it with other elements of an
accommodation claim. Unfortunately, courts do confuse these
elements,280 and this confusion probably makes it harder for courts to
resist suspicion creep. When insincerity is not an issue in the case, courts
should avoid allowing their suspicion to affect their legal analysis.
Hopefully, understanding the sincerity analysis will help to disentangle
and clarify other components of a religious accommodation claim,
especially “religious exercise” and “substantial burden.”
A.

Disentangling “Sincerity” and “Religious Exercise”

A religious accommodation claimant must show not only sincerity,
but also that the government (or employer’s) regulation creates a
“substantial burden” on the claimant’s “religious exercise.”281 These
three concepts are distinguishable. This Article has already discussed the
concept of sincerity at some length, distinguishing it from accuracy.282
Whether a claimant’s allegations are sincere should also be distinguished
from whether the claimant’s alleged “religious exercise” is
“religious.”283
Whether the religiosity of a claimant’s beliefs is an issue depends
upon the legal basis for the claimed accommodation. Some provisions
offer an accommodation for any moral objection, whether based on
religion or not.284 The state and federal provisions that give rise to most
accommodation claims, however, extend expressly to the exercise of

280. See supra notes 22–29.
281. See Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016).
A claim under the Free Exercise Clause must also show, as a precursor, that the regulation is not
“neutral and of general applicability.” See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531 (1993).
282. See supra Part VI.
283. See Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2007) (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting) (“[f]ree exercise jurisprudence requires that a plaintiff plead both sincerity and the
religious character of the plaintiff’s belief” otherwise “any sincere act is sacrosanct—and potentially
subject to constitutional protection”).
284. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2016) (“The [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]
will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which
are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.”).
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religion.285 Requiring the claimant’s objection to be based on religion,
therefore, is simply a matter of fidelity to the legal provision that
authorizes an accommodation.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the meaning of
“religion” in constitutional or statutory law, but courts tend to read the
word generously.286 Ordinarily it covers not only traditional western and
eastern religions but also a wide range of beliefs, practices, and
communities that sociologists and anthropologists define as religions.287
Faced with hard cases regarding the scope of “religion” or “religious
exercise,288 courts have broadly construed the concept to ensure a liberal
equality among those who hold diverse beliefs, including beliefs that
may be changing or novel.289
In the nature of language, however, “religion” cannot mean
everything.290 The most obvious beliefs that religion does not describe
are those that the adherent insists are not religious. Foisting “religious”
liberty on someone who disavows religion would certainly be ironic.
This is not to say that nonreligious people are not entitled to religious
liberty—they are entitled to be nonreligious, and to exercise their belief
that religion is bunk.291 It is only to say that an objection to complying
with a law that does not arise from religious beliefs (including atheistic
beliefs) does not entail an “exercise” of “religion.”
In addition, claims based on religious parodies are not religious. They
arise from parodies of religious exercise, not the exercise of religion.292
285. See supra Part III.
286. For a fairly comprehensive account of how courts have defined religion under different
constitutional and statutory provisions, see generally Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp.,
102 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2002). Judge Adams provided an influential account in a concurring opinion
in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring in result).
287. See WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 89–137
(2005); Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579,
587–604; Ben Clements, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 532 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 753, 756–62, 776–807 (1984); Koppelman, supra note 65; Jeffrey Omar Usman,
Defining Religion, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123 (2007); Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of
Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 814–21 (1997) (arguing for an “evolving” constitutional definition of
religion).
288. One, in my view, was Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013)
(holding that a fortune-teller’s business was not an exercise of “religion”).
289. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak, 592 F.2d at 212–13
(Adams, J., concurring in result).
290. What “religious” or “religion” means in a statute is a question of law; whether the
claimant’s alleged beliefs are “religious” is a question of fact.
291. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005).
292. See, e.g., Michelle Boorstein, For Georgetown ‘Apostles,’ a Rowhouse Rebellion, WASH.
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The claimant may sincerely believe in the political or ethical objects of
the parody, but that doesn’t mean that the activity is a religion, or that
the claimant sincerely holds religious beliefs. For instance, the Satanic
Temple appears to be a parody of religion that has the purpose of
eliminating the display of traditional religious faith in public spaces.293
No doubt the founder and adherents sincerely believe these things should
happen. This does not mean, however, that the Temple’s proposed
“After School Satan Club,” for example, is an exercise of religion.294
The Club may be protected, like the Good News Club or a Ku Klux Klan
Club, under the public forum doctrine of the Free Speech Clause,295 but
it is unclear whether the Club is entitled to a religious accommodation
because it is unclear whether the Club exercises religion.
Courts seem to do a fairly good job at sniffing out religious parodies,
even those based on nonreligious beliefs to which the claimant is
sincerely committed.296 Consider again the Flying Spaghetti Monster
case, Cavanaugh v. Bartelt.297 Recall that a prisoner alleged an
adherence to “FMSism” and claimed a right under RLUIPA to various
accommodations from ordinary prison regulations (including the right to
wear a pirate costume and to celebrate communion in the form of a large
bowl of pasta). The court assumed for purposes of analysis that the

POST (Nov. 11, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/11/10/AR2006
111001978.html [http://perma.cc/2JZ5-EFSM]; NCC Staff, When Festivus Was Recognized as a
Religion for Several Months, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY. (Dec. 23, 2016),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/when-festivus-was-recognized-as-a-religion-for-several-months
[http://perma.cc/E3QZ-LXN4].
293. See Katherine Stewart, An After School Satan Club Could Be Coming to Your Kid’s
Elementary School, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education
/an-after-school-satan-club-could-be-coming-to-your-kids-elementary-school/2016/07/30/63f485e65427-11e6-88eb-7dda4e2f2aec_story.html [http://perma.cc/NCD2-QV5C].
294. See Katherine Stewart & Moriah Balingit, Several School Districts Say After School Satan
Clubs Likely in Line With Policies, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/education/several-school-districts-say-after-school-satan-clubs-likely-in-line-withpolicies/2016/08/01/c5ea1558-581a-11e6-9aee-075993d73a2_story.html?utm_term=.0af6b5815185
[https://perma.cc/MK3M-5Z34].
295. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (1995).
296. See, e.g., Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th
Cir. 2016) (reviewing district court judgment on grounds that “[n]o reasonable juror could
infer . . . that Mooney’s religion is anything more than a strongly held belief in the importance or
benefits of marijuana”); Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819 (D. Neb. 2016) (prisoner’s
commitment to the ideology that inspired the Flying Spaghetti Monster and “FMSism” was not
religious); United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Wyo. 1995) (defendant’s beliefs in the
“Church of Marijuana” was not religious).
297. 178 F. Supp. 819 (2016).
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claimant was sincere, but concluded that FSMism is not a religion.298 It
began as a satire of the intelligent design movement.299 Its “religious”
incidents seem to be designed to mock traditional religion. At its core,
FSMism likely expresses a sincere belief about the nature of the universe
and a sincere belief that public schools should teach science a particular
way. But exercising speech rights to parody religion is not the exercise
of religion.
On the other hand, courts sometimes construe religion too narrowly.
In Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield,300 the court considered
whether a fortune-teller’s services amounted to an exercise of religion.
The claimant held eclectic beliefs on which she based her “psychic and
spiritual
counsel[ing],”
including
“‘[s]pirituality,
astrology,
Reiki . . . Kabala’” and “a strong belief in the ‘words and teachings of
Jesus’ . . . and a belief in ‘the New Age Movement,’ which [she]
describes as ‘a decentralized Western spiritual movement that seeks
Universal Truth and the attainment of the highest individual
potential.’”301 The court concluded that, “Moore[-]King’s beliefs more
closely resemble personal and philosophical choices consistent with a
way of life, not deep religious convictions shared by an organized group
deserving of constitutional solicitude.”302 The court emphasized that
Moore-King was largely responsible for curating her own beliefs, and
that those beliefs were not dominated by beliefs promoted by an
institution. While this may be a rational way to define religious exercise,
it is not the most generous that courts have offered.303 More importantly,
it risks running afoul of the no-orthodoxy principle for favoring
communal beliefs and practices over those that are privately curated.
The notion of religion is surely robust enough to embrace a mosaic of
beliefs and practices that are undoubtedly individually religious, no
matter how distasteful such religious consumerism may be to some.
A harder legal question is whether the Constitution requires extending
religious accommodations to beliefs and practices that are motivated

298. Id. at 824. It is quite possible that the claimant sincerely believed some doctrines of
FMSism, since they are stated in equivocal terms and he presented evidence suggesting his
sincerity, including the fact that he had “several tattoos proclaiming his faith.” See id. at 827.
299. Id. at 824–26.
300. 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013).
301. Id. at 564.
302. Id. at 571 (relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972)).
303. See generally Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 102 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2002).

06 - Chapman.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS SINCERITY

10/9/2017 10:07 AM

1245

strictly by sincere nonreligious conscientious objections.304 Though
religious and nonreligious conscientious objections are conceptually
distinct, there are often good reasons to extend accommodations to
both.305 When an accommodation provision expressly does so, of course,
a court need not concern itself with whether the conscientious objection
is based on religion. When a provision extends only to religious
exercise, though, courts can, and should, distinguish between whether
the exercise is “religious” and whether it is “sincere.”
Just as with the claimant’s sincerity, a court has an independent
responsibility to determine whether the claimant’s exercise is religious.
Unfortunately, courts have not been consistent on this score.306 Just as
with any other legal provision, the meaning of “religion” or “religious”
under an accommodation provision is a question of law.307 Whether a
claimant’s belief or exercise is religious is thus a mixed question of law
and fact. The claimant’s assertion that the belief or exercise is religious
is one—but only one—fact relevant to the legal inquiry. As in MooreKing, courts should independently evaluate whether the claimant’s
exercise is religious. Otherwise the claimant has the final word on
whether her claim is based on religious exercise. As long as the court has
adopted a sufficiently generous notion of religion, the no-orthodoxy
principle does not require courts to defer to the claimant about whether
her beliefs qualify. Doing so would essentially deputize sincere
claimants to extend the scope of religious liberty ad infinitum.308
B.

Disentangling “Sincerity” and “Substantial Burden”

A religious accommodation claimant must also show that the
regulation imposes a “substantial burden” on his “religious exercise.”
Whether the government regulation substantially burdens the claimant’s
religious exercise is a question of law. Assuming that the act or omission
at issue is religious and sincere, the court must determine whether the
government’s regulation burdens that act or omission, and if so, whether
the burden is substantial.
304. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See generally Gregory P. Magrarian, How
to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1903 (2001); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1351 (2012).
305. Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457.
306. See, e.g., Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007).
307. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972).
308. See Watts, 495 F.3d at 1303 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (“To interpret the First Amendment in
such a fashion would stretch the scope of free exercise claims to an untenable degree.”).
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The Hobby Lobby Mess

Hobby Lobby muddied the meaning of substantial burden. The
majority and the dissenting justices fundamentally disagreed about how
to evaluate whether the contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial
burden on the claimant’s religious exercise. To make matters worse,
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, failed to clearly address Justice
Ginsburg’s allegation that he had reduced the substantial burden analysis
to one about sincerity. The resulting confusion is entirely unnecessary in
light of RFRA’s text and historical background.309
The confusion arises from the nature of Hobby Lobby’s claims.
Hobby Lobby had a sincere religious objection to doing a particular
thing: buying insurance for employees that would cover certain
contraceptives.310 The reason Hobby Lobby objected to paying for such
insurance is that the owners of Hobby Lobby believe that those
contraceptives may in at least some cases result in the death of an
innocent human being.311 Their religion, as they understand it, forbids
them from knowingly paying for contraceptives that entail such a risk.312
The government did not question the owner’s sincerity or whether their
beliefs were religious.313
The majority and the dissenting justices disagreed about whether the
contraceptive insurance mandate placed a “substantial burden” on
Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise. The majority concluded that the
financial penalties that the government would be entitled to levy against
Hobby Lobby for failing to comply with the mandate constituted a
substantial burden.314 The dissenting justices thought this was the wrong

309. I share Paul Horwitz’s view that “credit (or blame)” for the decision in Hobby Lobby “lies”
“not with Justice Alito’s opinion” “but with RFRA, which supplies the propulsion in both Hobby
Lobby and Chief Justice Roberts’s equally clear opinion in Gonzales v. O Centro Epírita
Beneficente União do Vegetal.” Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154,
165 (2014). Accordingly, my analysis of what counts as a “substantial burden” relies on ordinary
methods of statutory interpretation. To me, whether an accommodation in any given case is morally
or politically desirable is another matter.
310. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 2766.
313. As Professor Gedicks has argued, it is possible that the government did not contest Hobby
Lobby’s sincerity because it would entail an “expensive” “fishing expedition” into the contraceptive
habits of the Green family by which “a jury would be repulsed.” Gedicks, supra note 28, at 112.
Given the sheer volume of contraceptive mandate accommodation claims, however, the most likely
explanation is probably that the government wanted a clean sweep on the legal issues rather than to
fight each case on the facts.
314. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
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way to look at it. Instead, Justice Ginsburg argued that there was no
substantial burden because the wrongs that Hobby Lobby did not want to
be involved in—the killing of innocent human beings—were simply too
attenuated from what the mandate required Hobby Lobby to do—pay for
insurance for employees who have a legal right to use such
contraceptives.315 Ginsburg thought the majority merged the sincerity
and substantial burden analyses.316 She apparently perceived the Court
as seeing itself legally obligated to accept not only that the claimant
sincerely believed that its religion forbade complicity in its employees’
use of certain contraceptives, but also that the claimant sincerely
believed that the regulation was a substantial burden on its religious
exercise. Justice Alito, writing for the Court, unfortunately failed to
clarify the difference between those two concepts.
2.

Sorting It Out

Hobby Lobby raised novel legal questions; the “substantial burden”
inquiry was not one of them.317 Once a claimant has established the fact
of a sincere religious belief, the court decides, as a matter of law,
whether the regulation at issue substantially burdens the claimant’s
religious exercise.318 This entails identifying and evaluating three things:
(1) what is the claimant’s religious exercise?319 (2) does the regulation
burden that exercise? and (3) is the burden “substantial”?320 The
principal dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby made an error at the first
step that doomed its analysis of the others.321
Hobby Lobby’s “religious exercise,” for purposes of the statute, was
abstaining from paying for contraceptive insurance. That exercise is the
only relevant act or omission for determining Hobby Lobby’s “religious
exercise” because it is what the mandate required and what Hobby
315. Id. at 2799.
316. See Gedicks, supra note 28, at 119 n.118; Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, supra note 17, at
38–39 (reading the majority opinion likewise).
317. In my view, the most difficult legal questions were whether RFRA protects closely held
for-profit corporations and whether the government had satisfied the “least restrictive means”
requirement. I filed a brief supporting the claimants, arguing that the Establishment Clause did not
prohibit their requested accommodation.
318. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
319. See Friedman v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 75 Fed. App’x 815, 818 (2003) (“[T]he
requisite nexus between the objection to immunization and plaintiff’s religious beliefs—if any—had
not been shown.”).
320. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015); Oklevueha Native Am. Church of
Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2016).
321. See infra notes 355–57.
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Lobby objected to doing.322 The reason Hobby Lobby objected to that
act or omission was the Greens’ religiously-informed moral beliefs
about facilitating sin.
Michael Dorf has argued that “[n]either the text nor the legislative
history of RFRA provides any clear indication of how courts ought to
determine whether an incidental burden on religion is in fact
substantial.”323 Although the statute does not define “substantial,” and
the legislative history may be silent on that precise point, the statute was
intended to implement the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Sherbert
v. Verner324 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.325 The burdens in those cases were,
respectively, the denial of employment benefits,326 and criminal
conviction and the imposition of a five-dollar fine.327
With respect to whether the government can be said to “burden” a
claimant’s conduct that the claimant believes to be wrong because it
would facilitate another’s sinful conduct, a case that followed Sherbert’s
reasoning is directly on point. In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division,328 a steel worker objected to
manufacturing tank turrets.329 The reason was because he believed that
doing so would facilitate others to do something he believed to be
sinful—making war.330 By contrast, Thomas was willing to work in the
same plant in the roll foundry.331 Because he declined to work on tank
turrets, though, he lost his job.332 Indiana declined to extend
unemployment benefits to him.333 The Supreme Court concluded that
this impermissibly burdened his religious exercise.334
322. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990)
(focusing on whether “the mere act of paying the tax, by itself, violates [the objector’s] sincere
religious beliefs”).
323. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1213 (1996).
324. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012) (“The purposes of this chapter are (1) to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened.”).
326. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963).
327. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–08, 220–21 (1972).
328. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
329. Id. at 710–11.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 712.
334. Id. at 720.
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With respect to Thomas’s moral reasoning, which allowed him to
work in the same plant, but not on tank turrets, the Court stated:
“Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was
an unreasonable one.”335 Once the government had determined that
Thomas’s beliefs were sincere and religious, it could not reject his claim
on the ground that it found his religiously-inspired moral reasoning to be
unpersuasive. The rationale for this limit, of course, is the no-orthodoxy
principle. If a court can reject a claim on the ground that the law simply
cannot countenance the claimant’s religiously-inspired moral reasoning,
it effectively favors other forms of religiously-inspired moral reasoning,
which threatens religious liberty and equality.
Just as in Thomas, the “religious exercise” to which Hobby Lobby
objected was a particular act that Hobby Lobby believed would facilitate
sin.336 Determining that Hobby Lobby was sincere and engaged in
religious exercise did not even begin the “substantial burden” analysis.
Hobby Lobby was still required to show two things as a matter of law:
the government imposed a “burden” on its religious exercise, and the
burden was “substantial.”337
To decide whether there is a “substantial burden,” a court must
determine whether the government’s regulation, as a matter of law,
forbids or requires the “religious exercise” at issue.338 Professor Gedicks
has argued that courts are so deferential to a claimant’s view about a
“substantial burden” that the standard is “effectively established by the
claimant’s mere say-so.”339 It is true that there has never been a great
deal of Supreme Court precedent on what counts as a substantial burden.
But the standard, as applied by the Supreme Court in prior cases, has
sufficient content to guide a court’s independent judgment and to place
limits on what forms of government regulation may count as a
“substantial burden.”340
First, it should be emphasized that a court has an independent duty to
determine the meaning of the challenged government regulation, and
thereby to determine whether it will actually operate the way that the
claimant alleges. Whether the claimant sincerely believes that the law
forbids or requires her religious exercise is irrelevant. Courts should not
335. Id. at 715.
336. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765–66 (2014).
337. Id. at 2775.
338. See, e.g., id. at 2779, 2798–99.
339. Gedicks, supra note 28, at 98.
340. For an outline of the Supreme Court cases touching on the issue, see VOLOKH, supra note
61, at 1068–69.
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subject the meaning and application of a law to a claimant’s religious
belief. While courts must defer to a claimant’s sincere and religiousbased mistake of fact (about whether the exercise at issue is really
immoral), they must not defer to the claimant’s sincere and religiousbased mistake of law (that the challenged regulation actually requires the
conduct to which the claimant objects).
Second, the Supreme Court has decided some cases that set guidelines
for the outer boundaries of a substantial burden. On the one hand, a
criminal conviction (even one that carries a minor penalty)341 and the
denial of important government benefits (unemployment compensation)
impose “substantial” burdens on religious exercise.342 It is unclear
whether a court would, or should, hold that a de minimis civil penalty,
an administrative inconvenience, a minor licensing fee, or the denial of
an “unimportant” benefit would amount to a “substantial burden” on
religious exercise. Surely context matters.
On the other hand, the Court has made clear that some categories of
government regulation do not impose a substantial burden on religious
exercise. For instance, in Bowen v. Roy,343 the claimant opposed the
government’s use of his daughter’s social security number on the ground
that it violated his religious belief for anyone to identify his daughter
with a number.344 The Supreme Court held that “[t]he Federal
Government’s use of a Social Security number for Little Bird of the
Snow does not itself in any degree impair Roy’s ‘freedom to believe,
express, and exercise’ his religion.”345 The Court likewise applied this
principle when a Native American tribe objected to the government’s
plan to build a road through federal land that was sacred to the tribe.346

341. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
342. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
343. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
344. Id. at 700–01 (quotation omitted); see also id. at 700 n.6 (“Roy’s religious views may not
accept this distinction between individual and government conduct. It is clear, however, that the
Free Exercise Clause, and the Constitution generally, recognize such a distinction; for the
adjudication of a constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual’s religion, must
supply the frame of reference.” (internal citation omitted)).
345. Id. at 700.
346. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988). I am
inclined to agree with Justice Brennan that the regulation at issue placed a substantial burden on the
claimants because it made it impossible for the claimants to engage in religious conduct. See id. at
458–60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is important to note, however, that some Native American
accommodation claims involving federal land use do not implicate the claimant’s religious conduct.
Under the notion of “substantial burden” articulated above, those claims, like the one in Bowen v.
Roy, would fail to show a substantial burden on the claimants’ religious exercise. See, e.g.,
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest
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These cases, though controversial,347 illustrate the relationship
between an “exercise of religion” and whether there is a substantial
burden on that exercise. While the claimants’ beliefs about what the
government ought to do with its own property or program were in some
sense a “religious exercise,” the claimants did not believe that they were
obligated to do or to abstain from an act that the government forbade or
required. As a result, the court concluded that the regulation did not
“substantially burden” their exercise. The cases may be read two
different but complementary ways: to hold that a religious belief about
what the government may or may not do does not amount to religious
“exercise” for purposes of an accommodation claim; or to hold that
government conduct that does not directly regulate or effect a claimant’s
religiously-motivated act or omission does not impose a “substantial
burden” on the claimant’s religious exercise. Either way, the cases
illustrate an important limit on the accommodation of sincere religious
exercise, a limit the court must independently evaluate before the
government is obligated to show that the regulation is the least
restrictive way to achieve a compelling interest.
The foregoing limits on what constitutes a “substantial burden” may
not be a model of precision, and they are certainly capacious. But
tallying these “secular costs” is not, contrary to detractors, “effectively”
deferring to the “claimant’s mere say-so,”348 nor does it render the
“substantial burden element functionally nonjusticiable.”349 Indeed,
before Hobby Lobby, scholars tended to challenge the Supreme Court’s
application of the “substantial burden” element for protecting too little
religious exercise, not too much.350
This account of “substantial burden” largely coincides with the
Court’s approach in Hobby Lobby. The Court accepted as true that
Hobby Lobby had a sincere religious objection to paying for
contraceptive insurance (its “religious exercise”); that the contraceptive
mandate “burdened” that exercise by requiring Hobby Lobby to do the
Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
347. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases:
Asserting A Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1062–67 (2005); Allison M.
Dussias, Ghost Dance and the Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization
Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 774–75
(1997).
348. Gedicks, supra note 28, at 98.
349. Id. at 101.
350. See Lupu, supra note 17, at 936 (“[T]he law [about burdens on religious exercise] that has
emerged thus far creates an intolerable risk of discrimination against unconventional religious
practices and beliefs.”).
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opposite; and that the burden was “substantial” because of the financial
penalties for noncompliance.351 Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s claim,
this did not “collapse” sincerity and substantial burden.352 It gave both of
them their due. Unfortunately, in attempting to respond to the dissent’s
critique, the Court stated that, “it is not for us to say that their religious
beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”353 This choice of words was
confusing. The Court probably meant that it could not determine the
centrality or importance of the claimant’s religious belief consistent with
the no-orthodoxy principle. But using “insubstantial” may have
reinforced the dissenting justices’ concern that the Court was collapsing
the sincerity and substantial burden inquiries. As the Court elsewhere
emphasized, however, the object of a substantial burden analysis is not
the sincerity or “centrality” of a claimant’s religious exercise, but the
governmental benefits and burdens that depend on the claimant
abandoning it.354
The account above differs considerably from the dissenting justices’
approach. Rather than evaluating whether the regulation placed a
“substantial burden” on Hobby Lobby’s “religious exercise,” Justice
Ginsburg evaluated whether Hobby Lobby’s “religious exercise”—
declining to pay for contraceptive insurance—was too causally
attenuated from the employees’ potential use of those contraceptives.355
Ginsburg seems to have collapsed Hobby Lobby’s “religious exercise”
and the reason for that exercise. Perhaps Ginsburg simply did not think
that RFRA should protect the religious exercise at issue in Hobby Lobby,
and was determined to show that the claimants ought to lose on every
element.356 But determining as a matter of law that RFRA does not apply

351. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014).
352. Id. at 2799.
353. Id. at 2779.
354. Id. at 2778, 2792.
355. A number of scholars have likewise argued that whether a law places a “substantial burden”
on a claimant’s religious exercise depends on the distance between the regulated conduct (of the
claimant) and the ultimate conduct of another to which the claimant objects. Some think that forced
payment of money can be a substantial burden on religious exercise and some don’t. Compare, e.g.,
Nomi M. Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2015) (concluding that forced payment is a substantial burden but,
because taxes are a forced payment too, there is no “less restrictive” means for the government to
achieve its interests), with Gedicks, supra note 28, at 123–24 (arguing that courts should evaluate
whether forced complicity with sin substantially burdens a claimant’s religious exercise). I don’t
think the causal connection matters for the “substantial burden” analysis because the burden is a
question of what the government does to coerce the claimant’s religious exercise, not the claimant’s
moral reasoning for that exercise.
356. Justices Breyer and Kagan, by contrast, did not join Justice Ginsburg’s opinion on whether
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to complicity claims would be inconsistent with the statute’s text, which
protects “religious exercise” without conditioning that protection on the
sort of theological or moral reasoning behind that exercise. It would also
be inconsistent with Thomas, in which the Court extended Sherbert to
protect a complicity claim that was conceptually very similar to Hobby
Lobby’s.357
Worse, Justice Ginsburg’s approach is in tension with the noorthodoxy principle, for it suggests that religious accommodations
should be available for some forms of religiously-inspired moral
reasoning but not for others.358 Carefully distinguishing between
religious sincerity and whether a government regulation imposes a
“substantial burden” on the claimant’s religious exercise may reduce this
risk.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to clarify the sincerity requirement of a
religious accommodation claim. Scholars, and occasionally judges, have
suggested that the First Amendment forbids the government from
adjudicating a religious claimant’s sincerity. This Article has argued to
the contrary. The Constitution forbids the government from determining
the accuracy or plausibility of a claimant’s religious beliefs, but not from
adjudicating the sincerity with which the claimant holds them. Courts
can and should evaluate a claimant’s sincerity, when an opponent puts it
in issue, to protect others from the costs of accommodating insincere
religious claims. Furthermore, courts should distinguish between a
RFRA protects closely held for-profit corporations. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2806 (Breyer
and Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
357. Cf. Horwitz, supra note 309, at 156 (“The polarizing nature of the issue, and of the Court’s
decision, was both reflected in and encouraged by Justice Ginsburg’s stinging dissent.”).
358. Cf. Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious
Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1908 (2015) (“[W]e are, in many
cases, without the moral clarity or authority to challenge someone’s belief that the conduct legally
required of him would make him complicit in what he perceives as wrong.”). Some scholars have
suggested that courts can avoid violating the “religious question doctrine” by evaluating complicity
by analogy to religiously-neutral legal norms of causation and responsibility. Gedicks, supra note
28, at 130–32; see also Elizabeth Sepper, Substantiating the Burdens of Compliance, 2016 U. ILL.
L. REV. ONLINE 53, 59 (noting that courts “regularly apply principles of proximity, causation, and
attenuation in a variety of First Amendment contexts”). Even if a judge could do so without
selecting from among a variety of legal causation doctrines one that that merely corresponded with
the judge’s own moral views, a legal focus on complicity is misplaced. As explained above, the
statutory question is whether the government’s regulation substantially burdens the claimant’s
religious exercise, defined as the claimant’s act or omission, not the reason for the claimant’s
religious exercise. See supra Part V.
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claimant’s sincerity, the claimant’s religious exercise, and whether the
government has placed a substantial burden on that exercise. Contrary to
the received scholarly wisdom, carefully adjudicating religious sincerity
may actually do more to promote than to undermine religious liberty.

